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I. INTRODUCTION
A limited liability company ("LLC") is a business entity intended to offer
its owners the limited liability protection of a traditional corporation and the
tax advantages of a partnership.' Although the Wyoming legislature enacted
1. For a comprehensive analysis of limited liability companies, including tax and business
aspects, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, I RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES (1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995); MARK A. SARGENT & WALTER D.
SCHWIDETZKY, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK (1994-95) [hereinafter SARGENT HAND-
BOOK]; Allan G. Donn, Practical Guide to Limited Liability Companies, in I STATE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS at PGLLC-I (Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J.
Jacobson eds., 1995-1 Supp.), Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability
Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991); Thomas E. Geu, Understanding the Limited
Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992); Thomas
E. Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part Two),
37 S.D. L. REV. 467 (1992) [hereinafter Geu, Part Two]; Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited
Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375 (1992). A bibliography of
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the first limited liability company statute in 1977,2 few states followed until
the Internal Revenue Service ruled in 1988 that LLCs would be treated like
partnerships for tax purposes? Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia
now allow for the formation of LLCs,4 and thousands have been formed in
the last few years.
Treatises, articles, and commentaries written about LLCs have focused
primarily on the organizational, tax, and formation aspects of the entity.'
articles written about limited liability companies is set forth in Chapter 7 of the SARGENT HAND-
BOOK, supra.
2. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified
as amended at Wyo. Stat. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (1989 & Supp. 1994)).
3. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360. Florida enacted LLC legislation in 1982, but few
states followed Wyoming's and Florida's lead until Revenue Ruling 88-76 was announced. In
1990, Colorado and Kansas enacted LLC statutes and Indiana enacted a statute requiring foreign
LLCs to register with the Indiana Secretary of State. In 1991, Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia
passed LLC legislation. By 1994, 43 states had enacted LLC statutes and six others were consider-
ing legislation, SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02. For a discussion of the origins and
pattern of LLC enactments, see SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.02; Keatinge et al., supra
note 1, at 381-84.
4. For the text of many state limited liability company statutes, see 2-4 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 1, app. D; 2-5 STATE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY & PARTNERSHIP LAWS
(Michael A. Bamberger & Arthur J. Jacobson eds., 1994 & 1995-2 Supp.). For a survey of the
existing statutes and pending legislation, see SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, ch. 5. As of this
writing, 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted limited liability company statutes and
the remaining states (Hawaii, Massachusetts, and Vermont) are considering adoption. ALA. CODE
§§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-995 (Supp. 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 29-601 to -857 (Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1993);
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17705 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101
(West Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-100 to -242 (West Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (1993 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-1301 to -1375
(Supp. 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 608.401-.514 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA. CODE ANN. §§
14-11-100 to -1109 (1994 & Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1994 & Supp. 1995);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to /1-60 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§
23-18-1-1 to -19 (Burns 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100-.1601 (West Supp. 1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7652 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455
(Michie/Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301-:1369 (West 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§
4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West Supp.
1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-29-101 to -
1204 (Supp. 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.740 (Vernon Supp. 1995); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Supp. 1994); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 86.010-.571 (Michie 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1 to :85 (1995); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie
1993 & Supp. 1995); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. LAW §§ 101-1403 (McKinney Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155
(1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1705.01-.58 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tiL 18,
§§ 2000-2060 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 63.001-.990 (1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 8901-8998 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-16-1 to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to
-59 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-201-101 to -248-606 (Supp. 1994); TEx. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (1994 &
Supp. 1995); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1995); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 25.15.005-.902 (West Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-I to -69 (Supp. 1995); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-1305 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (1989 & Supp.
1995).
5. John R. Emshwiller, New Kind of Company Attracts Many--Some Legal, Some Not,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1993, at BI.
6. See supra note 1. For helpful background material refer to sources listed supra note 1,
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Comparatively few authors, however, have addressed whether LLC interests
should be considered securities. Those who have are divided on the issue of
whether LLC interests should be treated as securities.7
While commentators continue to debate whether LLC interests should be
treated as securities, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and a
number of state securities regulators have taken action. On March 24, 1994,
the SEC filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia against Vision Communications, Inc. and several related parties!
The SEC alleged that the defendants violated the antifraud, securities registra-
tion, and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal securities laws by
selling membership units in a limited liability company.9 By the summer of
1995, the SEC had filed complaints against defendants in at least six unrelated
actions also alleging violations of the federal securities laws for selling inter-
ests in limited liability companies."0 An attorney with the SEC Division of
and see Limited Liability Company Bibliography in Chapter 7 of the SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, at 7-1 to 7-6.
7. Treatises, articles, and commentaries addressing whether LLC interests constitute securi-
ties include I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5 (proposing that there should
be at least a presumption against a "security" characterization for LLC interests or LLC interests
might be characterized as nonsecurities because LLC interests are closely held); MARK A.
SARGENT, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK ch. 3 (1993-94) (concluding that LLC inter-
ests are not securities in most instances); Donn, supra note 1, § 3.4, at PGLLC-16 (noting that the
determination depends on the circumstances of the particular case); S. Brian Farmer & Louis A.
Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 789, 828-30 (1991)
(suggesting courts will find an LLC interest a security if it satisfies the definition of investment
contract); Geu, Part Two, supra note 1, at 510-18, 520 (observing that there is no bright line test
and suggesting a case-by-case analysis depending on the organization and operating agreement);
Carol R. Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should Not Be Treated as
Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage this Result, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1994) (arguing an
LLC interest should not be treated as a security); Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 403-04 (stating
that the critical question is "whether profits are expected 'from the efforts of the promoter or a
third party"'); Joseph C. Long, Cellular Telephone and Wireless Cable Interests as Investment
Contracts, I Enforcement L. Rep. 86, 110-14 (1993) (stating that a unit in an LLC can be an
investment contract and therefore a security); John A. Peralta, Limited Liability Company Interests
as Securities, I Enforcement L. Rep. 29, 36 (1993) (LLC interests are usually securities); Larry E.
Ribstein, Form and Substance in the Definition of a "Security": The Case of Limited Liability
Companies, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (1994) (urging courts to hold that an interest in an
LLC is presumptively not a security); Mark A. Sargent, Will Limited Liability Companies Punch a
Hole in the Blue Sky?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 429, 439-40 (1994) (proposing that evaluation should be
on a case-by-case basis, without a presumption that LLC interests are securities) [hereinafter
Sargent Blue Sky]; Mark A. Sargent, Are Limited Liability Company Interests Securities?, 19
PEPP. L. REV. 1069 (1992) (arguing that LLC interests normally do not satisfy the definition of a
security) [hereinafter Sargent Article]; Marc I. Steinberg & Karen L. Conway, The Limited Lia-
bility Company as a Security, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1105 (1992) (arguing that LLC interests normally
are securities) [hereinafter Steinberg Article).
8. See SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket
880, 1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications, Inc.,
SEC News Digest 94-56-4, 1994 WL 94496 (SEC) (Mar. 25, 1994); SEC Enforcement: Alleged
Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject to SEC Suit, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (Mar.
28, 1994); Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interests in Cable Venture Subject of SEC Suit, Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 662 (May 6, 1994).
9. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994).
10. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995); SEC v. United Communications, Ltd., Litigation Release No.
14477, 59 SEC Docket 424, 1995 WL 254714 (SEC) (Apr. 24, 1995); SEC v. American Interac-
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Enforcement stated that the SEC was evaluating a number of LLC operations
to determine whether such organizations were violating federal securities
laws.'
At least sixteen states have taken action under state securities laws against
entities offering or selling LLC interests. 2 In at least twelve states, state
courts or regulators have ordered LLC promoters to cease and desist from
offering or selling LLC interests in violation of state securities laws, based on
findings of sufficient evidence to conclude such LLC interests were securi-
ties. 3 In addition, a number of jurisdictions have adopted legislation that ei-
ther expressly states or implies that LLC interests are securities. For example,
the legislatures in eight states amended their securities laws to expressly state
that certain LLC interests may be securities. 4 The legislatures in seven states
have amended their securities law statutes to include references to LLCs. 5
tive Group, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14462, 59 SEC Docket 203, 1995 WL 229088 (SEC)
(Apr. 10, 1995); SEC v. Future Vision Direct Mktg., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14384, 58 SEC
Docket 1716, 1995 WL 25731 (SEC) (Jan. 18, 1995); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab.
Co., Litigation Release No. 14085, 56 SEC Docket 1974, 1994 WL 186833 (SEC) (May 16,
1994); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knoxville, LLC, SEC News Dig. 94-130-10, 1994 WL
328317 (SEC) (July 12, 1994). For a discussion of such actions see part I1.A.
11. John R. Emshwiller, SEC Sets Sights on Certain Limited Liability Companies, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 31, 1994, at B2.
12. Emshwiller, supra note 5. In November 1993, an article in the Wall Street Journal stated
that at least 16 states had filed legal actions against a variety of wireless cable and related com-
munications technology firms on the grounds that they had violated securities laws by offering or
selling LLC interests. Id.
13. Orders have been issued under the securities laws of Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Many are summary cease and desist orders. Some of these orders are available on either
Westlaw or Lexis. Unfortunately, many trial and administrative decisions are unreported. For ex-
ample, California and New York courts, as well as federal courts, frequently do not publish their
securities opinions. JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAWS xi (1995). As a result, there may be
numerous orders relating to alleged violations of state securities laws for the offer and sale of LLC
interests that are not reported.
Table I of this article contains a summary of the various state actions either declaring that
LLC interests are securities or indicating that LLC interests may be securities. Table I is organized
by state and by case and provides the citation to each case. Table I sets forth the state action
taken, the securities law violations raised, and the securities law theories discussed. Finally, Table
I indicates whether the action was a summary order, or whether it resulted in written findings of
fact, conclusions of law, or an opinion.
14. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V) (Michie Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § I-
102(t) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). Table 11 of this article contains a listing of the state statutes
that expressly address whether LLC interests are securities under state law. Table II is organized
alphabetically by state and provides the statutory citation, a short summary of the statutory provi-
sion, and the relevant statutory language.
15. For example, the following state securities laws include references to LLCs: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995) (general statement); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.207A(2)(a)
(West Supp. 1995) (expedited registration by filing for small issuers); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1262(l) (Supp. 1994) (exempt transactions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp.
1995) (exempt transactions); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421 -B:1 I(11) (Supp. 1994) (registration
requirement); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:13(I) (Supp. 1994) (registration by coordination);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B: 17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994) (registration exemption); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 10-04-05(4), (10), (11), (13) (1995) (exempt securities); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(4), (6),
(10), (14) (1995) (exempt transactions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-07(2)(b)(3) (1995) (registration
1996]
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These references imply that the offer and sale of LLC interests are subject to
such securities laws. 6 The legislatures in four states included provisions in
their limited liability company acts that raise the securities law issue. 7 Addi-
tionally, a 1993 survey of state securities regulators indicated that twenty-four
states had taken the position, either formally or informally, that LLC interests
may be securities under their state securities laws. 8 A more recent survey of
state laws, regulations, and securities administrators indicates that now at least
thirty-five states have taken that position, either formally or informally. 9
The outcome of federal and state LLC securities litigation, together with
the various legislative measures, is of great practical importance to practitio-
ners. If an LLC interest is a security, it triggers, among other things, securities
registration requirements, broker-dealer registration requirements, securities
fraud liability, and in some cases disclosure obligations." The SEC, state
securities commissioners, and private parties2' may bring suit for securities
law violations. Criminal liability may even be imposed under certain circum-
stances.
Absent legislative action, many LLC ownership interests probably will not
be deemed securities. It is highly unlikely that courts will hold ownership
interests in all LLCs are per se securities. Nevertheless, based on the litigation
to date, it appears highly likely courts will hold that ownership interests in
LLCs with certain characteristics are securities.22 As a result, the structure of
an LLC may determine whether an ownership interest is a security.
Part II of this article provides an overview of the current federal and state
LLC securities litigation. It describes the types of offerings targeted by the
government and outlines the common characteristics these LLC entities alleg-
edly share. Part III analyzes the various theories asserted by commentators,
federal regulators, and state regulators to bring such LLC offerings within the
by description); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995) (exempt transactions).
16. See supra note 15.
17. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994) provides, "[n]othing in this chapter shall be
construed as establishing that a limited liability company interest is not a 'security'...." MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103 (West Supp. 1995) provides, "[an interest in a limited liability
company to which this act applies is a security to the same extent as an interest in a corporation,
partnership, or limited partnership is a security." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.185 (Vernon Supp. 1995)
states, "[it shall be rebuttably presumed that a member's interest in a limited liability company in
which management is not vested in one or more managers is not a security for purposes of any
and all laws of this state regulating the sale or exchange of securities." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.1303 (West Supp. 1995) provides, "[a]n interest in a limited liability company may be a
security ....
18. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 430-35.
19. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 1 6551; see also Tables 1, 1I, and III, infra, pp. 495-505.
20. See I RIBSrEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, §§ 14.02-14.03, at 14-6 to 14-12 (describing
federal and state requirements).
21. The author found only one reported case in which private parties alleged violations of
the securities laws in connection with the purchase or sale of an LLC interest. See Fransen v.
Terps Ltd. Liab. Co., 153 F.R.D. 655 (D. Colo. 1994) (seeking damages for violation of federal
and state securities laws in connection with the sale of membership interests in an LLC) (summary
judgment granted for defendants on other grounds). Although there are few reported cases, from
discussions with practitioners it appears that private parties are beginning to raise and litigate such
securities law claims.
22. See discussion infra parts IlIl.A, II1.B, and III.E.
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ambit of the securities laws. These theories include the investment contract
theory, risk capital analysis, the characteristics of stock test, the commonly
known as a security test, and state statutory grounds. Part III also presents
possible defenses to each of these theories. The discussion of each theory
concludes with the author's evaluation of the theory's applicability, and an
assessment of the arguments asserted and the defenses presented. Part IV
summarizes the analysis of these theories and discusses the author's conclu-
sions.
II. BACKGROUND ON FEDERAL AND STATE ACTIONS
Federal and state actions against LLC offerings have focused primarily on
entities selling interests in so-called "wireless cable" 3 and related communi-
cations technology. 4 Although such actions have been directed at wireless
communications companies, these cases indicate: (1) the type of LLC offering
the government is targeting; (2) the common characteristics these offerings
allegedly share; and (3) the types of claims raised by the government. But
even more importantly, these cases dispel certain myths and misconceptions
about LLCs.
For example, commentators have argued that LLC interests should not be
treated as securities because LLCs generally are closely held and member-
managed.2 5 They maintain that since most LLC members are actively en-
gaged in the management of the LLC, such investors are not dependent on the
efforts of others and therefore are not in need of the protection provided by
the securities laws. 6 They contend that LLC interests should not be treated as
securities because LLCs resemble general partnerships.27 General partnership
interests are presumed not to be securities because each partner retains control
over the management of the partnership."
The federal and state actions against LLCs illustrate that not all LLCs are
closely held or member-managed. In fact, some LLCs have hundreds of mem-
bers.29 These cases demonstrate that many LLC promoters have mass-market-
23. Wireless cable, also known as Super High Frequency Television ("SHFTV"), refers to a
method of transmitting video entertainment programming through the use of microwave radio
technology. SHFTV is a new broadcast system that uses microwave technology to transmit up to
32 video channels from a transmitter antenna to small rooftop antennas where signals are received
and sent to television sets for viewing. SHFTV technology allows wireless networks to broadcast
television programming similar to that offered by cable television companies. See Plaintiff Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief at 3 n.2, SEC v. Vision
Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994) [hereinafter
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision].
24. See, e.g., infra Table I pp. 495-98 (19 of the 23 state actions cited involve companies in
the telecommunications business).
25. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note I, § 14.02, at 14-5; SARGENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10 to 4-13.
26. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5 to 14-6.
27. See, e.g., l id. at 14-4; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10 to 4-11.
28. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); Williamson v. Tucker,
645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
29. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 7, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Sup-
1996]
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ed LLC offerings indiscriminately to the general public, using telemarketing
techniques, promotional mailings, and even television infomercials to induce
financially unsophisticated individuals to invest their retirement funds in LLC
ventures.3" The SEC and state regulators allege that such LLC investors often
have no practical control over their investment due to the number of investors,
the relatively small size of each investment, the geographic dispersion of the
investors, and the lack of sophistication of the typical investor.3 Such inves-
tors appear to be precisely the type of investors the securities laws were de-
signed to protect.
Prosecutors have targeted primarily LLC investment opportunities which
allegedly involved a relatively high degree of risk and were mass-marketed to
unsophisticated investors using high pressure sales techniques and claims of
immediate and exorbitant returns. 2 Admittedly, these egregious cases are not
representative of all LLCs, but they clearly demonstrate the inaccuracy of
common assumptions and generalizations that all LLCs are closely held and
member-managed. The following is an overview of several selected cases that
briefly describes the characteristics of these offerings, the claims raised by the




On March 24, 1994, the SEC filed suit against Vision Communications,
Inc., Wilkes-Barre-Scranton L.C., and two individual defendants.33 SEC v.
Vision Communications, Inc.34 was the first case in which the SEC sought a
judgment under the federal securities laws in connection with the offer and
sale of LLC interests.: The case raised an issue of first impression36 in the
federal courts: whether an LLC interest was a security and therefore subject to
federal securities laws.
port of Its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief at 2,
SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. May 16, 1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg].
30. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 4-6, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Reply Memorandum in Support of its Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 3-4, SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR),
1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C. May 11, 1994) [hereinafter Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision];
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 5, 7-8, 15, (No. 94-1079).
31. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-16, (No. 94-1079).
32. See supra note 30.
33. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994).
34. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868 (D.D.C.
May 11, 1994).
35. Emshwiller, supra note 11.
36. See Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order at 12-14, SEC v. Vision Communications, No. 94-0615




The defendants in Vision Communications purportedly were developing a
wireless cable television system.37 They claimed to be selling interests in an
LLC to raise capital to obtain a license to install, operate, and market a super-
high-frequency-television system, or to purchase an interest in such a system
in the Wilkes-Barre-Scranton, Pennsylvania area."
The SEC alleged several violations of the federal securities laws. First, the
SEC maintained that membership units in the LLC constituted investment
contracts and as such were securities under the Securities Act of 1933'9 ("Se-
curities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 19 3 4'° ("Exchange
Act").4' Second, the SEC charged that the defendants offered and sold these
unregistered securities in violation of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities
Act. 2 Third, the SEC asserted that the defendants engaged in the business of
selling the securities without registration as broker-dealers in violation of
section 15(a) of the Exchange Act.43 Finally, the SEC alleged that the defen-
dants made false and misleading statements about the LLC and its business
prospects in violation of section 17(a) of the Securities Act," section 10(b) of
37. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
38. Id. at 3, 5.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1994).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994).
41. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 9-16, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
42. Id. at 1. Section 5(a) of the Securities Act provides:
Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly
(1) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through
the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security
for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77e(a).
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of
the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or
otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security
15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
43. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section 15(a)
of the Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer ... to make use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect any transactions in, or to in-
duce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security ... unless such broker or
dealer is registered in accordance with [the Exchange Act].
15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1).
44. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
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the Exchange Act,4" and Rule lOb-5 promulgated under the Exchange Act.'
The SEC sought emergency relief, including a freeze on the defendants' as-
sets, a temporary restraining order, an order for a preliminary injunction, an
order for a permanent injunction, and civil penalties."
The SEC described the defendants' sales activities as a "boiler room oper-
ation"'  where sales people made cold calls and used high pressure sales
techniques49 to solicit scores of financially unsophisticated, geographically
dispersed investors." The solicited investors allegedly possessed little or no
business experience and included clerical workers, blue-collar workers, and
retirees, who were often induced to invest their retirement funds.5 The SEC
charged that the defendants made numerous false statements, including misrep-
resentations about immediate, exorbitant returns and the risks associated with
the investment.52 In response, the defendants argued that ownership interests
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a).
45. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails ... [tlo use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
46. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). Rule lOb-5
promulgated under the Exchange Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
47. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 1, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
48. Id. at 1, 5. The term "boiler room" is usually used to refer to
a temporary operation established to sell a specific speculative security. Solicitation is by
telephone to new customers, the salesman conveying favorable earnings projections,
predictions of price rises and other optimistic prospects without a factual basis. The pro-
spective buyer is not informed of known or readily ascertainable adverse information; he
is not cautioned about the risks inherent in purchasing a speculative security; and he is
left with a deliberately created expectation of gain without risk.
Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969) (citations omitted).
49. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615) (alleging the
use of high pressure techniques, including "repeated telephone calls," that were "insistent and
aggressive").
50. Id. at 2, 5, 7, 13. The defendants' allegedly raised at least $1.25 million from about 125
investors nationwide. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 2, 7; Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision at 2-4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615). According to the SEC, $759,000 in individual retirement account ("IRA") funds were trans-
ferred to the defendants to be invested in the LLC. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 7, 1994
WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
52. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5-7, 14-15, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). The
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in LLCs were not securities and therefore not subject to the federal securities
laws or SEC jurisdiction.53 The defendants also denied any misconduct.5 4
They claimed that the investors were fully and accurately apprised of the risks
associated with the venture in the promotional literature and operating docu-
ments.5 The defendants pointed to carefully crafted operating provisions and
procedures intended to insure that the LLC interests would not be deemed
securities."
On March 24, 1994, the day the SEC filed its complaint, the United States
District Court granted the SEC's request for emergency relief.57 The court
froze all investor funds under the defendants' control and ordered that any
new funds raised be placed in an interest-bearing escrow account.58 After
taking the matter under advisement, on April 13, 1994, less than a month after
the SEC filed its complaint, the court ordered the defendants to immediately
cease offering or selling interests in the LLC pending trial.5 9
On May 11, 1994, the United States District Court entered a final judg-
ment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the regis-
tration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws.' The court,
however, made no findings of fact or conclusions of law.6 The defendants
agreed to the entry of a permanent injunction without admitting or denying the
allegations." The defendants also waived the entry of findings of facts and
conclusions of law.63 Although the SEC won its first battle and obtained a
judgment, the federal court did not issue an opinion on the securities law
issues. Nevertheless, the decision is significant because the granting of the
injunction indicates that the LLC interests were securities.
SEC charged, among other things, that the defendants falsely stated that the LLC had an opera-
tional 20 channel wireless cable system, the LLC had obtained all necessary regulatory approvals,
investors would receive 300% to 400% returns on their investment within three years, and the
risks of an investment in the LLC were extremely low. Id. at 5-7.
53. Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 1-2, 24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
54. See id. at 2-3.
55. Id. at 3, 25-27.
56. See id. at 16-19.
57. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC Docket 880,
1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications, Inc., supra
note 8; SEC Enforcement: Alleged Boiler Room Sales of Interest in Cable Venture Subject to SEC
Suit, supra note 8.
58. See supra note 57.
59. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14054, 56 SEC Docket
1472, 1994 WL 148556 (SEC) (Apr. 18, 1994); Civil Action Against Vision Communications Inc.,
SEC News Digest 94-72-3, 1994 WL 131465 (Apr. 18, 1994).
60. SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., No. 94-0615 (CRR), 1994 WL 326868, at *1-*2
(D.D.C. May 11, 1994); SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14081, 1994
WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (May 11, 1994).
61. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1 (final judgment); see also Vision
Communications, 1994 WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (litigation release).
62. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1 (final judgment); see also Vision
Communications, 1994 WL 183414 (SEC), at *1 (litigation release).
63. The defendants waived the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Vision Communications, 1994 WL 326868, at *1
(final judgment).
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2. Parkersburg, Knoxville, and Other SEC Actions
The SEC has taken action against a number of other wireless cable televi-
sion and communications ventures purportedly selling LLC interests. In SEC v.
Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Co., the defendants allegedly sold LLC
interests to raise capital to acquire or develop a wireless cable television sys-
tem in Parkersburg, West Virginia.' In SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, the defen-
dants allegedly sold LLC membership interests to acquire part of a wireless
cable television system in Knoxville, Tennessee.65
Parkersburg and Knoxville are mirror images of the Vision Communica-
tions case. As in Vision Communications, the SEC sought temporary restrain-
ing orders, preliminary injunctions, and other relief for violation of the federal
securities laws.' The SEC charged that the defendants violated the antifraud,
securities registration, and broker-dealer registration provisions of the federal
securities laws.67 In each case, the United States District Court quickly issued
temporary restraining orders." The court later entered preliminary injunctions
temporarily restraining and enjoining the defendants from violating the federal
securities laws, pending resolution of the action on the merits.' In each case,
the court entered final judgments permanently enjoining certain defendants
from future violations of the securities laws.7" However, because the defen-
dants had agreed to the injunctions and waived the entry of findings of facts
and conclusions of law, the federal court did not issue any opinion on the se-
curities law issues.
7'
64. Complaint, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C.
May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Parkersburg Complaint]; SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co.,
Litigation Release No. 14085, 1994 WL 186833 (SEC) (May 16, 1994); SEC Suit Alleges Boiler
Room Scheme Involving Unregistered LLC Securities, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 775
(May 27, 1994); SEC Enforcement: SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving Unregistered
LLC Securities, Sec. L. Daily (BNA) (May 24, 1994).
65. Complaint, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No. 941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994)
[hereinafter Knoxville Complaint); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knoxville, LLC, et al., SEC
News Digest 94-130, 1994 WL 328317 (SEC) (July 12, 1994).
66. Parkersburg Complaint, (No. 94-1079); Knoxville Complaint, (No. 941073B).
67. Parkersburg Complaint, (No. 94-1079); Knoxville Complaint, (No. 941073B).
68. Temporary Restraining Order and Order Freezing Certain Assets and Granting Other
Relief, and Setting Hearing for Motion for Preliminary Injunction, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No.
941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., Litiga-
tion Release No. 14091, 1994 WL 194875 (SEC) (May 19, 1994); Temporary Restraining Order
and Order Freezing Certain Assets and Granting Other Relief, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd.
Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. May 18, 1994); Commission Obtains TRO Against Knox-
ville, LLC, et al., supra note 65; SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving Unregistered
LLC Securities, supra note 64; SEC Enforcement: SEC Suit Alleges Boiler Room Scheme Involving
Unregistered LLC Securities, supra note 64; Temporary Restraining Order Entered Against
Parkersburg Wireless LLC and Other Defendants, SEC News Digest 94-95-3, 1994 WL 195526
(May 20, 1994).
69. SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538, 1995 SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21,
1995); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., Litigation Release No. 14126, 56 SEC Docket
2534, 1994 WL 264301 (June 15, 1994); Court Enters Preliminary Bar in Alleged LLC Boiler
Room Scheme, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 982 (July 8, 1994); Preliminary Injunction
Entered Against Parkersburg Wireless LLC and Other Defendants, SEC News Dig. 94-113, 1994
WL 262956 (SEC) (June 16, 1994).
70. SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 94-1079 (JHP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15006, at *1-*6 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1994); SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538,
1995 SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21, 1995).
71. SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 94-1079 (JHP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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The SEC's allegations in Parkersburg and Knoxville parallel those in
Vision Communications. The SEC maintained that the LLC interests constitut-
ed investment contracts and were, therefore, securities.72 The SEC charged
that the defendants in both cases used high pressure sales tactics to solicit nu-
merous financially unsophisticated investors nationwide, who were induced to
invest their retirement funds through the use of false and misleading state-
ments.73
By the summer of 1995, the SEC had filed complaints against defendants
in at least four other unrelated actions also alleging federal securities law vio-
lations for selling interests in LLCs.74 One of the most publicized cases is an
action against Irwin "Sonny" Bloch, a "self-styled consumer advocate" and
nationally syndicated radio talk show host. Bloch has been charged in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York with de-
frauding investors of $3.8 million in connection with the sale of LLC member-
ship interests in radio stations. 75 Additional SEC enforcement actions against
entities and individuals offering and selling LLC interests are bound to fol-
low.76
B. State Actions
State securities commission actions against LLCs predate the SEC's first
suit in Vision Communications.77 Although federal cases tend to be more
15006, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1994); SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14538, 1995
SEC LEXIS 1594 (June 21, 1995).
72. See Knoxville Complaint at 1, (No. 941073B); Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission's Ex Parte Application for Tempo-
rary Restraining Order and Other Relief and Application for Preliminary Injunction and Other
Relief at 10-19, SEC v. Knoxville, LLC, (No. 941073B) (RBB) (S.D. Cal. July 11, 1994) [herein-
after Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville]; Parkersburg Complaint at 2-3, (No. 94-1079);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 11-16, (No. 94-1079).
73. Knoxville Complaint at 1, 7-8, (No. 941073B); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Knoxville at
1-2, 4-7, (No. 941073B). The SEC alleges that the defendants raised $12 million from more than
575 investors in 48 states. Id. at 2-3. More than $2 million in individual retirement account funds
("IRAs") were invested in the LLC. Id. at 3; Parkersburg Complaint at 2, 9-10, (No. 94-1079);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 4-7, (No. 94-1079). The SEC alleges that the defen-
dants in Parkersburg raised at least $10 million from hundreds of investors. Id. at 2. At least 333
investors invested $3.6 million in Parkersburg through IRAs. Id.
74. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995); SEC v. United Communications, Ltd., Litigation Release No.
14477, 59 SEC Docket 424, 1995 WL 254714 (SEC) (Apr. 24, 1995); SEC v. American Interac-
tive Group, LLC, Litigation Release No. 14462, 59 SEC Docket 203, 1995 WL 229088 (SEC)
(Apr. 10, 1995); SEC v. Future Vision Direct Mktg., Inc., Litigation Release No. 14384, 58 SEC
Docket 1716, 1995 WL 25731 (SEC) (Jan. 18, 1995).
75. SEC v. Irwin Harry Bloch, Litigation Release No. 14511, 59 SEC Docket 931, 1995 WL
317420 (SEC) (May 25, 1995).
76. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
77. For example, the Indiana Cease and Desist Order in In re Express Communications states
that North Dakota and South Dakota issued cease and desist orders against Express Communica-
tions on April 14, 1992, and February 27, 1992, respectively, two years before the SEC began to
take action against such wireless communication companies. Compare In re Express
Communictions, Inc., No. 93-0027 CD, 1993 Ind. Sec. LEXIS 46, at *8 (Mar. 23, 1993) (orders
issued in 1992) with SEC v. Vision Communications, Inc., Litigation Release No. 14026, 56 SEC
Docket 880, 1994 WL 96945 (SEC) (Mar. 24, 1994) (first SEC action filed March 24, 1994).
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widely followed and carry more precedential value than similar state cases, 78
it appears the numerous state prosecutions of LLCs prompted the SEC to initi-
ate actions against LLCs under the federal securities laws. 79 In fact, the SEC
briefs in Vision Communications, Parkersburg, and Knoxville each catalog
state actions against LLC offerings in support of the SEC's claims."
Table I summarizes some of the actions taken under state securities laws
against defendants offering or selling LLC interests.8 Table I is organized by
state and indicates the action taken, the securities law violations raised, and
the theories of liability discussed." Action has been taken against LLCs un-
der state securities laws in Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Min-
nesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, and
Wisconsin. 3 Many other states have also taken action, but such lower court
and administrative securities decisions often are not reported.84 As a result,
the list in Table I may be only a small sampling of the state actions against
defendants offering or selling LLC interests.
The vast majority of these state actions involve defendants offering LLC
interests in wireless communication companies, such as cellular telephone
businesses, interactive video ventures, and wireless cable television systems. 5
State regulators charge that many of these wireless communication companies
are packaging their investment products as LLCs to avoid state and federal
securities laws. 6 State actions against these LLCs have been aimed at closing
down such wireless communication investment-sales operations.87
78. Most state securities statutes parallel, or are patterned after, the federal Securities Act
and the federal Exchange Act. Sauer v. Hays, 539 P.2d 1343, 1346 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); see
also People v. Schock, 199 Cal. Rptr. 327, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (stating California law was
patterned after the federal Securities Act). While state courts are not bound by federal law inter-
preting their state's securities statutes, state courts generally consider federal authority highly
persuasive. See, e.g., State v. Gunnison, 618 P.2d 604, 606-07 (Ariz. 1980); Schock, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 331; Lowery v. Ford Hill Inv. Co., 556 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Colo. 1976); Sauer, 539 P.2d at
1346-47; State v. Kershner, 801 P.2d 68, 69 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
79. A list of state actions is set forth in Table I, pp. 495-98 of this article. Four states
brought action against Parkersburg Wireless Limited Liability Company before the SEC brought
its action in the summer of 1994. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-10, (No. 94-
1079). Two states brought action against the two named individual defendants in Vision Communi-
cations before the SEC brought its action against them in Vision Communications. See Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Vision at 2-3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615). At least three states, South Da-
kota, South Carolina, and Iowa, issued cease and desist orders against Knoxville, LLC before the
SEC brought its action. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at 7, (No. 941073B).
80. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-10, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memoran-
dum in Vision at 2-3, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at
7, (No. 941073B).
81. See infra Table I pp. 495-98.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See JOSEPH C. LONG, 12 BLUE SKY LAW xi (1992). For example, a Wall Street Journal
article reported that 16 states had filed actions against Express Communications, a company in-
volved in offering LLC interests in wireless communications companies. Emshwiller, supra note
5, at B2. However, WESTLAW and LEXIS reported only three such actions against Express
Communications. See infra Table I pp. 495-98, Illinois Express Action, Indiana Express Action,
and Washington Express Action.
85. See infra Table I pp. 495-98.
86. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
87. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
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In each of the cases listed in Table I, the state charged the defendants
offering LLC interests with violating securities registration and broker-dealer
registration provisions of state securities laws.8" In some cases, the state
charged the defendants with violating antifraud provisions as well.89 In every
case, the trier of fact found sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendants
violated state securities laws in offering or selling LLC interests. 9w The defen-
dants did not prevail in any of the actions reported. 9' Unfortunately, the ma-
jority of these cases involved the issuance of summary cease and desist or-
ders.92 Often the trier of fact either cited no legal theory, or simply made a
conclusory finding that the LLC interest was an investment contract and
therefore constituted a security.93
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY AND POSSIBLE DEFENSES
The securities laws apply only if a transaction involves a security. 9'
While there are some differences, the basic definition of a "security" in the
Securities Act,95 the Exchange Act96 and under state securities laws97 is the
same. 9 The term "security" generally covers a broad range of transactions,
but there is no single test for determining what constitutes a security. 99 Each
88. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see column labeled "Securities Law Violations Ad-
dressed").
89. Id.
90. See infra Table 1 pp. 495-98 (see column labeled "Action Taken").
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see column labled "Legal Theories Discussed"); see also In
re UEG, L.C., No. 93E068, 1993 WL 208898 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 12, 1993) (no legal
theory discussed); In re Hancock Communications Riverside PCS, No. 93E-058, 1993 WL 145928
(Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (Apr. 14, 1993) (conclusory finding that LLC interest was an investment con-
tract).
94. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, 3 SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 2.02
(1990).
95. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1994).
96. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994).
97. Thirty-five states have adopted securities acts based on the 1956 version of the Uniform
Securities Act, which was amended in 1958. UNIF. SEC. ACT (1958), 7B U.L.A. 154 (Supp. 1995).
Six states have adopted securities acts based on the 1985 revision of the Uniform Securities Act,
which was amended in 1988. UNIF. SEC. ACT (1988), 7B U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 1995). Therefore,
forty-one jurisdictions have adopted acts modeled on the Uniform Securities Act. The 1956 Uni-
form Securities Act and the 1985 Uniform Securities Act shall be referred to collectively herein as
the Uniform Securities Acts. The term "security" is defined in § 401(1) of the 1956 Uniform Secu-
rities Act and in § 101(16) of the 1985 Uniform Securities Act. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958),
7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
98. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16), 7B
U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985). The definition of
"security" in the Uniform Securities Act is modeled after the definition in § 2(1) of the federal
Securities Act. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l), 7B U.L.A. 583 cmt. (1985). The definition of "security"
in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act is virtually identical to the definition in § 2(1) of the Securities
Act. See infra note 99. Further, the United States Supreme Court stated that the definition of "se-
curity" will be treated as identical for purposes of both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 686 n.l (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36, 342 (1967).
99. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, 2 SECURITIES REGULATION 871 (3d ed. 1989 & 1994
Supp.); see also statutory definitions of "security," supra note 98. For example, § 2(1) of the
Securities Act, which is virtually identical to the definition in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act and
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the acts sets forth a list of specific instruments that are considered securi-
ties, such as stocks, bonds, notes, and debentures."m The statutory definitions
also include a number of catch-all phrases for instruments that do not fit into
the conventional categories, such as "certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement," "investment contract," and any "instrument
commonly known as a 'security."""'
Although a few states have amended their state law definition of a "secu-
rity" to include interests in limited liability companies, 102 the federal acts and
the securities laws in most states do not expressly list interests in limited lia-
bility companies. 3 Since LLC interests generally are not included in the
enumerated list of interests and instruments that constitute securities under the
federal securities acts or the Uniform Securities Acts,"°4 LLC promoters and
commentators argue that LLC interests are not securities. °5
The SEC, state regulators, and commentators counter that LLC promoters
may not use formalistic devices to insulate what is in substance a security
from the application of the securities laws."m They argue that the United
the definitions in the Uniform Securities Acts, provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
ment, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security,
fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities
(including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or
any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. §77b(l).
Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act defines a security in substantially the same manner
except (i) it does not contain a reference to "evidence of indebtedness," (ii) it excludes from the
definition short-term "commercial paper," and (iii) it uses a slightly different approach to classify
oil and gas interests. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
100. See supra note 99, definition of security in § 2(1) of the Securities Act; 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 401(1) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT. §
101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
101. See supra note 100. These general catch-all phrases are not defined in the federal securi-
ties acts or the Uniform Securities Acts. As a result, the courts have been left to define these
terms.
102. The legislatures in Alaska, California, Indiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin amended the definition of security in their state securities laws to expressly
include certain LLC interests. See supra note 14. The statutory language of these provisions is set
forth infra Table 11 pp. 499-501. Commentators argue that the enumeration of certain LLC inter-
ests in the list of instruments constituting securities does not result in LLC interests becoming
securities per se. For a discussion of this issue and the various defenses see infra parts III.E.2,
III.E.3.
103. See statutory definitions of "security," supra notes 97-99.
104. See statutory definitions of "security," supra notes 97-99.
105. See, e.g., Opposition to Plaintiff SEC's Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Other Relief and Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 11-12, SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless
Ltd. Liab. Co., (No. 94-1079) (SSH) (D.D.C. filed May 16, 1994) [hereinafter Defendants' Memo-
randum in Parkersburg].
106. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 10, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615) (cit-
ing Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981));
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 12, (No. 94-1079) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422);
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States Supreme Court has rejected the use of rigid, formalistic analysis to
determine whether an instrument constitutes a security. 7 Courts have broad-
ly construed the securities acts to extend to "[n]ovel, uncommon or irregular
devices" '' 8 in an attempt to reach the "countless and variable schemes de-
vised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the promise of
profits.' 9
The SEC, state regulators, and commentators assert that LLC interests are
securities because they fall into the general catch-all categories that have been
left to the courts to define."' They argue that LLC interests are securities
because they (i) constitute an investment contract;"' (ii) meet the re-
quirements of the risk capital test adopted by some states;'2 (iii) possess the
characteristics of stock;"' (iv) constitute an instrument commonly known as
a security;" 4 or (v) are subject to liability on state statutory grounds. ' 5 The
following sections discuss these various theories, present possible defenses,
and conclude with the author's evaluation of each theory.
A. Investment Contract Theory
1. Arguments Asserted
The SEC"6 and at least twenty-three state securities commissions" 7
have taken the position that certain LLC interests constitute securities under
the investment contract test set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. '" Section
2(1) of the Securities Act," 9 section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act 2" and
most state securities laws' 2' provide that an "investment contract" is a securi-
ty. In Howey, the United States Supreme Court set forth a four-prong test to
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Knoxville at 10, (No. 941073B) (citing Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422).
107. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
108. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943).
109. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; infra parts III.A-D.
111. See infra part III.A.
112. See infra part III.B.
113. See infra part III.C.
114. See infra part III.D.
115. See infra part III.E.
116. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 10-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 12-16, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Knoxville at 10-14, (No. 941073B).
117. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 916551; see also infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see columns
labeled "Legal Theories Discussed" and "Action Taken" for associated citations); infra Table III
pp. 502-05 (discussion of Connecticut release, Indiana policy statement, Kansas interpretive opin-
ion, Minnesota interpretive opinion, Montana opinion letter, Oklahoma exemption request, South
Carolina statement of policy, South Dakota Division of Securities letter, Tennessee statement of
policy, and Wyoming interpretative opinion).
118. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1). For the text of § 2(1), see supra note 99.
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). For a comparison of the text of § 2(1) of the Securities Act and
§ 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, see supra note 99.
121. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16)
(1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the state law definitions of a "security,"
see supra notes 97-99.
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determine whether an interest is an "investment contract."'22 The Court stat-
ed, "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a con-
tract, transaction or scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money, [2] in a
common enterprise and [3] is led to expect profits [4] solely from the efforts
of a promoter or a third party .. 2 '
The following is a discussion of each of the four elements of the Howey
investment contract test, which includes an overview of how courts have inter-
preted each element and an analysis of whether an LLC interest is likely to
meet each requirement. The analysis indicates that LLC interests typically
meet the first three prongs of the Howey test; therefore, the key issue in de-
termining whether an LLC interest is a security usually depends on whether
profits are expected from the efforts of a promoter or a third party. Conse-
quently, most of the discussion in this section focuses on the fourth prong of
the Howey test, with particular emphasis on the arguments asserted by the
SEC and state securities regulators, who have claimed that certain LLC in-
terests are securities.
a. Investment of Money
Courts have broadly interpreted the investment of money requirement.'24
It is clear that the investor need not invest cash.'25 All that is required is that
the purchaser give up some tangible and definable consideration.'26 Such
consideration may be goods or services.'27 In fact, anything constituting legal
consideration under contract law is probably sufficient to meet the investment
of money requirement.'
An investment in an LLC normally would satisfy the first prong of the
Howey investment contract test. While the LLC statutes do not require mini-
mum contributions in exchange for membership interests, 29 members usually
agree as to what and how much property or services each member will con-
122. See W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. at 298-99.
123. Id. The definition of "security" in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act is virtually identical to
the definition in § 2(1) of the Securities Act. See supra note 99. The United States Supreme Court
has stated that the definition of "security" will be treated as identical for purposes of both the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. Supra note 98. As a result, even though the Howey Court
expressly addressed the definition of "investment contract" under the Securities Act, the same
four-prong test is used to interpret "investment contract" in the Exchange Act and in many state
securities laws. See supra notes 78, 98.
124. See infra note 127.
125. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the United States
Supreme Court expressly rejected the argument that to meet the definition of an "investment con-
tract" the investment must take the form of cash. Id. at 560 n.12.
126. Id. at 560.
127. See, e.g., Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1976) (providing credit for a
loan); El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir.) (supplying collateral for a
loan), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974); Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) R 93,772 (D.D.C. May 19, 1988) (specific wage concessions); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v.
Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 445 (N.D. Ohio 1975) (services).
128. Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Security," in GLOBAL CAPITAL MAR-
KETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES 105, 109 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991). But see Ameri-
can Grain Ass'n v. Canfield, Burch & Mancuso, 530 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. La. 1982).
129. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 5.03, at 5-4.
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tribute to the enterprise. 3 ' Most LLC statutes are broadly phrased so that
cash, property, or services constitute eligible contributions. 3' Member contri-
butions are often important in determining each member's rights.'32 In the
SEC actions and the state actions noted in Table I, investors contributed cash
to the LLC ventures at issue.'33
b. Common Enterprise
Generally all courts agree that the common enterprise prong of the Howey
test'34 is satisfied when there is a pooling of interests of several investors
who share an investment risk with each other.33 This type of pooling of
multiple investors' interests is known as "horizontal commonality."' 36 Such
an arrangement will usually satisfy any version of the Howey test.'37
Courts disagree, however, on whether "vertical commonality" is suffi-
cient.'38 Vertical commonality requires only that one investor and one pro-
moter be involved in some common enterprise.'39 Some courts require a
130. Id. at 5-4 to 5-5.
131. Id. § 5.04, at 5-5.
132. Id. § 1.04, at 1-4, § 5.02, at 5-2.
133. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 2, 4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 5, 13, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiff's Memorandum in
Knoxville at 3, 11, (No. 941073B); In re Express Communications, Inc., No. 9200106, 1993 WL
566300, at *17 (II. Sec. Dep't) (Dec. 13, 1993) [hereinafter Illinois Express Action]; Report and
Recommendation of Referee at 51, Cleland v. Express Communications, Inc., No. 50-93-0075 (Ga.
Mar. 23, 1994) [hereinafter Georgia Express Action].
134. For in-depth discussions of the common enterprise test and related case law, see 2 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 927-35; Carl W. Schneider, The Elusive Definition of a "Securi-
ty": A 1990 Update, in GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES 119,
120-21 (Franklin E. Gill ed., 1991); Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108-09 & n.21-23, 26;
John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, "Common Enterprise" Element of Howey Test to Determine
Existence of Investment Contract Regulable as "Security" Within Meaning of Federal Securities
Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS §§ 78a et
seq.), 90 A.L.R. FED 825 (1988).
135. MARC 1. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 2.02, at 22 (1989); Schneider,
supra note 134, at 120; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108 n.22 (quoting STEINBERG, supra,
at 250).
136. See supra note 135. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that a showing of hor-
izontal commonality is required to meet the common enterprise test. See, e.g., Hart v. Pulte
Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Union Planters Nat'l Bank v.
Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1124 (1981)); Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir.
1982); Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 276-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
887 (1972).
137. See supra note 135.
138. See Long v. Schultz Cattle Co., Inc., 881 F.2d 129, 140 & n.l I (5th Cir. 1989); 2 Loss
& SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 928-35 & n.130; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22;
Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1108-09. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have expressly
rejected the view that horizontal commonality is required to meet the common enterprise test.
Long, 881 F.2d at 140. These circuits have found vertical commonality sufficient. See, e.g.,
Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp., 698 F.2d 1121, 1124 (11 th Cir. 1983), affd en
banc, 730 F.2d 1403 (11 th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 478-79
(5th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). Some state statutes expressly state that vertical commonality is suffi-
cient to meet the common enterprise requirement. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-51-
201(17) (West 1995).
139. STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22; Schneider, supra note 134, at 121; Steinberg
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showing of horizontal commonality, rather than vertical commonality alone, to
satisfy the common enterprise test."
An investment in an LLC would normally meet the common enterprise
requirement. Most LLC statutes require an LLC to have more than one owner
or two or more members. 4' In the typical LLC venture, multiple investors
pool their contributions and share the risk of the venture. Under such circum-
stances there is horizontal commonality and the common enterprise element of
the Howey test is met.
Probably the only instance in which an LLC would not meet the horizon-
tal commonality test is when it had only one owner or member. LLC statutes
in at least seven states permit an LLC to be formed with only one owner and
do not require the LLC to have more than one member.'42 Even though a
number of statutes permit this structure, the typical LLC will usually have
more than one member. Also, if there is at least one investor and one promot-
er, the venture may still meet the vertical commonality test which is sufficient
to meet the common enterprise requirement in many circuits.'43 In the SEC
actions, for example, prosecutors alleged both horizontal commonality and ver-
tical commonality were present because each investor received a pro rata share
of the profits generated through operation or sale of the LLC venture and,
therefore, the common enterprise element was satisfied.'"
c. Expectation of Profits
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,'45 the United States Su-
preme Court elaborated on the expectation of profits element of the Howey
test. 46 The Court noted that in referring to profits it has meant either capital
appreciation from the development of the initial investment,41 or a participa-
Article, supra note 7, at 1109.
140. Long, 881 F.2d at 140-41; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 22; Steinberg Article,
supra note 7, 1108-09 & n.23. The theoretical and practical problems presented by requiring only
horizontal commonality are discussed in 2 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 930-31; James D.
Gordon III, Common Enterprise and Multiple Investors: A Contractual Theory for Defining In-
vestment Contracts and Notes, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 635, 660-63.
141. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 4.03, at 4-3 to 4-4.
142. Id. at 4-3 n.8. At least one commentator, Allan Donn, warns that a single member LLC
is not advisable, even if state LLC statutes permit such a structure. Mr. Donn notes that the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") has not announced how a single member LLC will be taxed, there-
fore, there is a substantial risk that the IRS will classify such an LLC as a corporation for tax
purposes. Dorm, supra note 1, § 4.3, at PGLLC-17 to -18.
143. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text. The broader version of the vertical com-
monality approach only requires some relationship between the investor's success or failure and
the promoter's efforts. Under a narrower version of the vertical commonality test, there must be a
direct relationship between the investor's profit and loss and the promoter's profit and loss. See id.
144. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 11-12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 940615);
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiffs Memorandum in
Knoxville at 11-12, (No. 941073B); see also Illinois Express Action at *16, 1993 WL 566300
(No. 9200106).
145. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
146. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-58.
147. Id. at 852. To illustrate the capital appreciation concept, the Court cited SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943), which involved the "sale of oil leases conditioned on
[the] promoters' agreement to drill [an] exploratory well." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
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tion in earnings resulting from the use of investors' funds." The Court
stressed that the critical inquiry is the motive of the purchaser.'49 If an inves-
tor is attracted by the prospect of a return on his investment, the expectation
of profits element is met. 5" However, when a purchaser is motivated to use
or consume the item purchased, the expectation of profits element is not
met.'
5'
In most situations, an investor contributes to an LLC venture expecting to
make a profit from either capital appreciation or earnings.'52 Generally, there
is no problem establishing the expectation of profits element. " For example,
in the SEC actions, prosecutors presented evidence that promoters enticed
investors by promises of enormous and immediate returns in brochures and
sales calls, thereby demonstrating that purchasers were motivated to invest
because of the expectation of profits.'54 Even though state LLC statutes do
not expressly require LLCs to be operated for profit, " and some states even
appear to permit not-for-profit LLCs,'56 the vast majority of LLCs are oper-
ated for profit.'57
d. Solely from the Efforts of Others
The final element of the Howey test is that the investor must expect prof-
its to be derived "solely from the efforts of a promoter or a third party."'
58
In applying the Howey test, lower federal courts have rejected a literal inter-
148. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852. To illustrate the concept of participation in earnings, the Court
cited Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1967), where "dividends on the investment
[were] based on a savings and loan association's profits." Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
149. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53.
150. Id. at 852 (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)). Lower court
opinions have held that "the promotion of an investment 'largely for tax advantages' may consti-
tute an "expectation of profits." Also, "'the prospect of tax benefits resulting from initial losses
does not necessarily detract from an expectation of profits."' 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99,
at 937 & nn.150-51.
151. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852-53. For example, in Forman, the Court held that the sale of
stock to tenants in a cooperative housing project did not constitute the sale of securities since such
tenants purchased the stock for "personal consumption, [as] living quarters for personal use." Id. at
858. Similarly, the Court noted that the purchase of real estate would not constitute the purchase
of a security if the purchaser desired to "'occupy the land or develop it [himself]."' Id. at 852-53
(quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)).
152. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1110.
153. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; Peralta, supra note 7, at 41.
154. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 5-6, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 6, (No. 94-1079); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Knoxville
at 5-6, (No. 941073B).
155. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 16.07, at 16-29; Donn, supra note 1, § 4.5, at
PGLLC- 18.
156. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 16.07, at 16-29 & n.119; Donn, supra note 1,
§ 4.5, at PGLLC-18.
157. Commentator Allan Donn argues that even though some state LLC statutes do not ex-
pressly require LLCs to be operated for profit, there may be an implied "for profit" requirement if
the statute sets forth the permitted businesses in which an LLC may engage. Mr. Donn cautions
that even if not-for-profit LLCs are permitted by state law, an LLC that does not conduct a busi-
ness and have a profit objective risks losing the tax advantages associated with an LLC. Donn,
supra note 1, § 4.5, at PGLLC-18.
158. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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pretation of the word "solely." Ten circuits have adopted a more liberal and
flexible interpretation, simply requiring proof that "the efforts made by those
other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." '59
As a result, many courts have found an investment constituted a security, even
when the investor was required to participate to some extent, provided his
efforts were not the undeniably significant ones."'
While the United States Supreme Court expressly reserved judgment on
whether the term "solely" should be interpreted literally, 6' the Court deleted
the term "solely" in its restated formulation of the Howey test.'62 Also, the
Court's repeated direction to evaluate transactions in light of economic reali-
ties and the ease with which the securities laws could be circumvented if the
"solely" language were interpreted literally suggests that when faced with the
question, the Court will adopt the more liberal and flexible interpretation.'63
Since most LLCs involve an investment of money in a common enterprise
with the expectation of profits," 4 the pivotal issue in determining whether an
LLC interest is a security becomes whether profits are expected "solely from
the efforts of others." If profits are to come substantially from the efforts of
others, the interest may be a security. On the other hand, if profits are to come
from the joint efforts of the members, the interest may not be a security. 65
So whether an LLC interest is a security depends, in part, on the management
structure of the LLC, the allocation of management control, and the relation-
ship among investors and third parties.
159. This more liberal and flexible test is set forth in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc.,
474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The more liberal interpretation of
the term "solely" has been adopted by nine other circuits. Rivanna Trawlers, Unlimited v. Thomp-
son Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240 n.4 (4th Cir. 1988); SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d
349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir.
1982); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Williamson v.
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Aldrich v. McCulloch
Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3 (10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d
912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976).
160. See, e.g., SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479, 485 (5th Cir. 1974);
Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d at 482.
161. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16 (1975).
162. In Forman, the United States Supreme Court restated the Howey test as follows: "The
touchstone is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expec-
tation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others." Id. at 852.
The restated test is repeated in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561
(1979).
163. SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
164. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10.
165. Cf 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 961-63 (analogous discussion distinguishing




In literature promoting the use of LLCs, commentators have touted the
LLC as a highly flexible entity which allows the owners of the business to set
up management of the entity as they please." s While most LLC statutes pro-
vide that management is vested in the members of the LLC,' 67 the statutes
generally allow the members to opt out of the member-managed form and
adopt a corporate-style centralized management structure by agreement.'" In
other words, the LLC members can choose to manage the LLC directly them-
selves or delegate full or partial responsibility for management to a manager
or group of managers. 69 Typically, such managers are not required to be
members. 7
In a very closely held, member-managed LLC in which each member is
financially sophisticated and participates actively in the venture, the LLC inter-
est is probably not a security under the Howey investment contract test.' 7'
But not all LLCs are closely held or member-managed. Some LLCs have hun-
dreds of members. In some cases, members have placed controlling power in
the hands of promoters or third parties.' The structure of such LLCs often
resembles a corporation or a limited partnership where investors are passive
participants. The key inquiry in such situations becomes whether "the efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones,
those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the
enterprise."'7 Given the flexibility of the LLC management structure, wheth-
er an LLC is a security under the investment contract test depends on the facts
and circumstances of the particular investment arrangement.
[2] Allocation of Management Control
If, for example, an LLC's articles of organization or operating agreement
allocate members' powers as in a limited partnership, the LLC interest may be
a security.' 4 Limited partnership interests are normally considered securities
under the Howey investment contract test.'75 This is because limited partners
166. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-4.
167. Most LLC statutes provide that the entity will be managed by LLC members, unless the
articles of organization provide otherwise. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4;
SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1-13 n.38; Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-36 to -37.
Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Texas permit management by separate managers, as in
corporations. I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 8.02, at 8-2, IS-47 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
168. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at
390.
169. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 1-4; Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-37.
170. Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-37; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 397.
171. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2.
172. See, e.g., Emshwiller, supra note 11; Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 2-4, 12-13,
1994 WL 326868 (No. 940615); Plaintiffs Memorandum in Parkersburg at 2, 14-15, (No. 94-
1079).
173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
174. Cf. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) (indicating that if an agreement
allocates partnership power as in a limited partnership, such an arrangement may be held to be an
investment contract), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
175. See, e.g., L&B Hosp. Ventures, Inc. v. Healthcare Int'l, Inc., 894 F.2d 150, 151 (5th
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
have little or no authority to participate in the management of the partner-
ship. "'76 In fact, to insure their status as limited partners and to preserve their
limited liability, it is essential that they not participate in the management of
the partnership.' Also, limited partners cannot ordinarily dissolve a partner-
ship nor do they have the power to bind other partners."' Limited partners,
therefore, are presumed to depend on the efforts of others.'79 Consequently,
if an LLC is structured as a limited partnership, it is likely that an interest in
such an LLC is a security. 80
But what about situations where the articles of organization or operating
agreement allocates management powers to each member? LLC promoters
argue that under such circumstances each member has the ability to protect his
or her investment and exercise his or her managerial rights.'' The mere
delegation of certain powers does not undermine such rights.8 2 Because the
investors are ultimately in control and, therefore, not dependent on the efforts
of others, there is no investment contract and no security.' 83
The SEC and state regulators argue that the grant of certain management
powers in an operating document should not immunize an LLC from charges
that its interests are securities. For example, the operating documents of some
LLCs grant their members management powers, but those same LLCs have
hundreds of geographically-dispersed, unsophisticated members who have
delegated control of the entity to promoters or third parties.8 4 The SEC and
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 815 (1990); Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-08 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979); 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[2] (citing nu-
merous authorities).
176. Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); see, e.g., 3 BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 94, § 2.0512], at 2-50.
177. See, e.g., 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[2].
178. Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346.
179. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10.
180. Cf supra note 174. Limited partnership interests are considered securities under the
investment contract test because of the limited partners' (1) lack of management control, (2) limit-
ed liability, (3) lack of dissolution powers, and (4) lack of power to bind. See supra notes 175-78.
An LLC may be structured to resemble a limited partnership. As indicated in the text, an operat-
ing agreement can delegate substantial authority to managers, leaving LLC members with little or
no control. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text; see also SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02t1], at 4-11. Members of an LLC also have limited personal liability. SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 2.02(1], at 2-3; Donn, supra note 1, § 1, at PGLLC-6,
§ 6.2, at PGLLC-30. Dissolution provisions of LLC acts typically are modeled after the Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act dissolution provisions. Donn, supra note 1, § 12.2, at PGLLC-45
to -46. Also, an LLC member's power to bind can be restricted by a provision in the articles of
organization or elsewhere. I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 8.06, at 8-17.
181. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 16-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); cf Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating
that when a partnership agreement allocates powers to general partners and those powers provide
the general partners with the ability to protect their investment, then the presumption is that the
partnership is not a security).
182. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
cf Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) ("The delegation of rights and duties [by
partners]-standing alone-does not give rise to the sort of dependence on others which underlies
the third prong of the Howey test."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
183. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 16-19, 24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); cf Banghart, 902 F.2d at 808.
184. See, e.g., supra note 172.
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state regulators charge that interests in such LLCs are securities since the
members expect to receive profits from the efforts of others.' s5 In making
their case that such members are in fact relying on the efforts of others, the
SEC and state prosecutors have focused on three factors: (1) the lack of so-
phistication of certain investors; (2) the special management or entrepreneurial
skill supplied by promoters or third parties; and (3) the lack of control the
investors have over the investment as a practical matter.' 6
For example, in many of the LLC communications ventures targeted by
the SEC and state regulators, prosecutors claimed investors had little or no
business experience.' 7 Members included retirees, clerical workers, and
blue-collar workers unfamiliar with business operations or communications
technology.' 8 The promotional materials distributed to investors often touted
the experience and background of the management team and even informed
investors that their roles would be similar to shareholders.'89 While the oper-
ating documents were carefully drafted so that members retained certain man-
agement powers, '" prosecutors argued that the investors had no practical
control over their investment.'9 ' Prosecutors maintained that because mem-
bers were so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business, they were inca-
pable of intelligently exercising any managerial control.'92 As a result, mem-
bers were dependent on the promoters or managers. The SEC also charged
that the promoters solicited primarily unsophisticated, individual investors who
were geographically dispersed. Given the number of investors, the compara-
tively small size of each investment, and the geographic distribution of inves-
tors, the SEC argued it was highly unlikely such investors could exercise any
meaningful control over the LLC."9 The SEC therefore concluded that the
investors were required to rely on the efforts of others.9 '
(a) Partnership Case Law
In support of their position that such LLC interests are securities, prosecu-
tors have relied on a line of cases that deals with when partnership interests
185. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 14-15, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-15, (No. 94-1079).
186. Commentator Carl Schneider has noted that in applying the fourth prong of the Howey
test, courts may examine any or all of these three factors. Schneider, supra note 134, at 122. In its
briefs, the SEC has focused on all three factors. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at
12-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-15, (No.
94-1079); see also Illinois Express Action at *4, *14, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
187. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Memorandum in Vision at 2, 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
188. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Vision at 3-4, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615).
189. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 4, 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
190. Id. at 13.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.; cf Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir.) (stating that with respect to
partnership interests, "at some point there would be so many partners that a partnership vote
would be more like a corporate vote, each partner's role having been diluted to the level of a
single shareholder in a corporation"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
194. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 12, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
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and joint ventures interests may be securities.'95 These cases focus primarily
on the economic reality of the transaction and the relationship among inves-
tors. The seminal case in this area is Williamson v. Tucker.'9 In Williamson,
the court noted that even if the investor retains some managerial control, the
investment may still be a security if the investor can demonstrate "he was so
dependent on the promoter or on a third party that he was in fact unable to
exercise meaningful [managerial] powers."'97 The Williamson court described
three situations where such an interest may constitute a security: (1) if the
agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the inves-
tors that the arrangement distributes power as would a limited partnership; (2)
if the investor is "so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs
that he is incapable of intelligently exercising" his managerial powers; and (3)
if the investor is "so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial
ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of the
enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful" managerial power.9" The Wil-
liamson court also recognized that other factors could give rise to dependence
on the promoter or manager so that the exercise of control would be effec-
tively precluded.' 99
In support of their contention that certain LLC interests may be securities,
prosecutors cite cases"° such as Siebel v. Scott,"' SEC v. Professional
Associates, 2 SEC v. International Loan Network, Inc.," and SEC v.
Aqua-Sonic Products Corp."°4 In Siebel, the Fifth Circuit held that limited
partnership interests in a cable television system were securities because the
limited partners did not plan or desire to participate in the operation of the
system and viewed themselves as simply investors relying on the managerial
skills of the general partner to bring in profits. 5 In Professional Associates,
the Sixth Circuit held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
that interests in a joint venture to exploit leased phonographic master tapes
were securities because at least some of the investors were entirely passive
and relied on the expected efforts and expertise of the venture's manager.2
In International Loan Network, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
held that an investment in a financial distribution network constituted a securi-
ty because investors looked predominantly to others to generate profits. 2 7 In
Aqua-Sonic Products Corp., the Second Circuit held that licenses for the sale
195. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum in Vision at 12-13, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14-16, (No. 94-1079).
196. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.) (analyzing whether the purchase of joint venture interests in
parcels of undeveloped real estate were securities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
197. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 424 n.15.
200. See supra note 195.
201. 725 F.2d 995 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1242 (1984).
202. 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984).
203. 968 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
204. 687 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
205. Siebel, 725 F.2d at 998-99.
206. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d at 357.
207. International Loan Network, 968 F.2d at 1308.
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of certain dental devices were securities, even though investors retained some
legal rights over distribution, because the promoters of the scheme sought to
attract only passive investors.0 8
(b) State Interpretative Opinions
Prosecutors' arguments are bolstered further by interpretative opinions
issued by state securities regulators. A 1993 survey of state securities regula-
tors indicated that as many as fourteen state securities agencies had taken the
position, either formally or informally, that LLC interests may be investment
contracts under their state securities laws.2" A more recent survey of state
securities regulators and state policy statements indicates that now at least
twenty state securities agencies have taken that position, either formally or
informally.2 Of these, at least ten state regulatory agencies have issued for-
mal opinions stating that LLC interests may be securities under their state
laws.2 State securities agencies in nine states have stated in policy state-
ments, opinions or no-action letters that whether an LLC interest is a security
in their state turns on the facts-and-circumstances investment contract analy-
sis.2"2 Specifically, the key issue is whether profits are expected to be de-
rived substantially through the efforts of others.2 3 These opinions indicate
208. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d at 585.
209. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 431 & n.14.
210. See I Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) J 6551.
211. Limited liability company interpretative release, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 14,562
(Conn. Aug. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Connecticut Release]; Statement of policy on classification of
limited liability company interests as securities, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 124,681 (Ind. Sept.
20, 1993) [hereinafter Indiana Policy Statement]; Interpretative Opinion Orchards Drug, L.C., 1991
WL 101804 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 1, 1991) [hereinafter Kansas Interpretative Opinion); Ex-
emption for professional limited liability companies, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 32,630 (Mich.
Mar. 24, 1994) [hereinafter Michigan Exemptive Order]; Interpretive Opinion, Lindquist, Vennum
Professional Ltd. Liab. Co. (Minn. Dep't Comm.) (Dec. 27, 1993) [hereinafter Minnesota Interpre-
tive Opinion]; Opinion Letter, H-I Missoula, LLC (Mont. Sec. Dep't) (June 15, 1995) [hereinafter
Montana Opinion Letter]; Exemption request--Offers of interests in limited liability company, 2
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) Tj 40,642 (N.J. Bureau of Sec.) (July 27, 1994) [hereinafter New Jersey
Exemption Request); Exemption request-Membership interests in a limited liability company, 2A
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 46,664 (Okla. Dep't of Sec.) (Aug. 28, 1992) [hereinafter Oklahoma
Exemption Request]; Statement of Policy 95-2-Limited liability company membership interest as
securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9H 51,580 (S.C. Secretary of State and Sec. Comm'r) (June,
1995) [hereinafter South Carolina Statement of Policy]; Limited liability company interests as
securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 54,521 (Tenn. Mar. 7, 1995) [hereinafter Tennessee
Statement of Policy]. See infra Table III pp. 502-05 for a summary of state policy statements,
interpretative opinions and no-action letters.
212. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,569-70; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Minnesota Interpre-
tive Opinion, supra note 211; Montana Opinion Letter, supra note 211; Oklahoma Exemption
Request, supra note 211, at 41,655-56; Letter from Debra M. Bollinger, Director, S.D. Div. of
Sec., to Hon. Thomas C. Barrett, Executive Director of State Bar of S.D. (May 16, 1995) [herein-
after South Dakota Letter]; Tenessee Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,559-60; Draft
Interpretative Opinion Letter, Are Limited Liability Company Memberships Securities?, at I
(Wyo. Secretary of State) (July 16, 1993) (in-house opinion drafted by staff members of the Wyo-
ming Securities Division and has not been released as a formal legal opinion of the Wyoming
Attorney General's office) [hereinafter Wyoming Draft Opinion].
213. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,570-71; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Minnesota Interpre-
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that the determination depends not only on the legal control granted in the
operating documents but also on the member's actual ability and opportunity
to exercise such powers in a meaningful way.
2 4
(c) State Litigation
In addition, at least twelve states have ordered certain LLC promoters to
cease and desist from offering or selling LLC interests in violation of state
securities acts." 5 The majority of these cases involved the issuance of sum-
mary cease and desist orders, where no opinion was issued, but sufficient evi-
dence was found to conclude a violation of the securities laws occurred.2"6
Often the trier of fact either cited no legal theory217 or simply made a
conclusory finding that the LLC interest constituted an investment con-
tract. 8 Nevertheless, these decisions are significant because the sanctions
applied indicate the state court or state administrative authority found that the
LLC interests constituted securities and usually made such findings based on
an investment contract analysis.2 9
(d) State Administrative Decisions
While there have been no reported judicial decisions analyzing the
grounds upon which LLC interests have been found to be securities, 220 ad-
ministrative decisions issued by hearing officers in Illinois and Georgia pro-
vide detailed analysis and reasoned opinions that preview the battleground for
future litigation.2 In those state enforcement proceedings, the hearing offi-
cers found the LLC interests constituted securities under state securities law by
tive Opinion, supra note 211, at 2; Montana Opinion Letter, supra note 211, at 2; Oklahoma Ex-
emption Request, supra note 211, at 41,655-56; South Dakota Letter, supra note 212, at 2; Ten-
nessee Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,559-60; Wyoming Draft Opinion, supra note
212, at 1, 4.
214. See Connecticut Release, supra note 211, at 10,554; Indiana Policy Statement, supra
note 211, at 19,570-71; Kansas Interpretative Opinion, supra note 211, at *2; Oklahoma Exemp-
tion Request, supra note 211, at 41,656; South Dakota Letter, supra note 212, at 2; Tennessee
Statement of Policy, supra note 211, at 48,560; Wyoming Draft Opinion, supra note 212, at 5.
215. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 for a summary of state actions under state securities laws
against defendants offering or selling LLC interests (see columns labeled "Action" and "Action
Taken" for citations to applicable authorities).
216. See, e.g., Feigin v. Infotech Group, Inc., No. 94 CV 1756, 1994 Colo. Sec. LEXIS 1, at
*1-*6 (Apr. 8, 1994); In re Express Communications, Inc., No. 93-0027 CD, 1993 Ind. Sec.
LEXIS 46, at *1-*12 (Mar. 23, 1993).
217. See, e.g., In re Replen-K, Inc., Nos. SE 9209063, SE 9301897, SE 9304735, 1993 WL
451199 (Minn. Dep't Comm.) (Oct. 7, 1993); In re UEG, L.C., No. 93E068, 1993 WL 208898
(Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (May 12, 1993).
218. See, e.g., In re Hancock Communications Riverside PCS, No. 93E-058, 1993 WL
145928 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r) (Apr. 14, 1993); In re Parkersburg Wireless, LLC, No. 9403-11,
1994 WL 125846 (Pa. Sec. Comm'n) (Apr. 6, 1994).
219. See infra Table I pp. 495-98 (see columns labeled "Action," "Action Taken," and "Legal
Theories Discussed").
220. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.03[l][b], at 4-18; Georgia Express Action at 40,
(No. 50-93-0075).
221. Georgia Express Action at 34-64, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *9-*17,
1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
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applying the investment contract test.222 Both hearing officers applied the
definition of investment contract set forth in Howey and its progeny as adopt-
ed in each state223 and focused primarily on the element of reliance on the
efforts of others.224 Both hearing officers discussed general partnership cas-
es,225 including the language and exceptions stated in Williamson v. Tuck-
er.226 In the Georgia enforcement action, the hearing officer found that al-
though each member had the power to make managerial decisions for the
LLC, the members could not effectively exercise control because they lived in
diverse geographic areas, and lacked technical expertise and business experi-
ence.22 Because the members were incapable of exercising the illusory pow-
ers granted to them, they were placed in the position of relying on the exper-
tise and managerial abilities of others.28  Similarly, in the Illinois en-
forcement action, the hearing officer found that even though the investor was
offered the opportunity to become an officer of the LLC, he was unsophis-
ticated and believed himself to be in the hands of an expert that would take
care of matters for him.229 As a result, he could effectively exercise his man-
agerial rights only with the expert advice of others.230
[3] Summary
Under the Howey investment contract test, an LLC interest is a security if
a person invests money in a common enterprise with the expectation of profits
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.2 1' In the cases to
date involving LLC interests, the battle has been waged over whether investors
expected profits from the efforts of others.232 To support their position that
certain LLC interests are securities, prosecutors have focused on the economic
realities of the transaction to demonstrate that LLC members relied on the ef-
forts of others.233 Prosecutors have pointed to: (1) the lack of sophistication
of certain investors; (2) the special management or entrepreneurial skills sup-
plied by third parties; and (3) the lack of control investors had over the invest-
222. Georgia Express Action at 61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *8, 1993 WL
566300 (No. 9200106).
223. Georgia Express Action at 51-61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *9, *15-
*16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
224. Georgia Express Action at 57-61, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *13-*14,
* 16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
225. Georgia Express Action at 58-60, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at * 11-* 13,
1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
226. Georgia Express Action at 58-60, (No. 50-93-0075); Illinois Express Action at *12, 1993
WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
227. Georgia Express Action at 60, (No. 50-93-0075).
228. Id. at 60-61.
229. Illinois Express Action at *16, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106).
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 122-23, 161-62 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 12-24, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615)
(contending that the LLC interests at issue are not investment contracts only because they do not
meet the profits from the efforts of others element of the Howey test); Defendants' Memorandum
in Parkersburg at 13-30, (No. 94-1079) (contending the LLC interests at issue are not investment
contracts, but focusing only on the efforts of others element of the Howey test).
233. See supra notes 184-94 and accompanying text.
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ment as a practical matter.234 Prosecutors have relied on the Williamson case
and its progeny which detail the circumstances whereby partnership interests
and joint venture interests may be securities.235 Prosecutors' arguments have
been bolstered by interpretative opinions issued by state securities regulators,
the many cease and desist orders issued in state enforcement actions, and the
two administrative decisions that were issued in state enforcement actions.236
2. Possible Defenses
Commentators and even LLC promoters concede that typically LLC inter-
ests meet the first three prongs of the Howey investment contract test.237 The
purchase of LLC interests generally involve an investment of money in a com-
mon enterprise with an expectation of profits. As a result, the critical issue in
determining whether an LLC interest is a security becomes whether profits are
expected solely or substantially from the efforts of others.23
But some commentators and LLC promoters contend that there should be
a presumption against characterizing LLC interests as securities. 29 They ar-
gue courts have held that general partners in a general partnership are not
solely or substantially dependent on the efforts of others when, under state
partnership law or a partnership agreement, partners retain the ultimate power
to control the business.24 Several courts have stated there is a strong pre-
sumption that general partnership interests are not securities under the Howey
test.24" ' Further, courts have stated that an investor who claims a general part-
234. See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 195-208 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 209-30 and accompanying text.
237. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-2; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra
note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-10; Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 12-24, 1994 WL 326868 (No.
94-0615) (contending that the LLC interests at issue are not investment contracts only because
they fail to meet the profits from the efforts of others element of the Howey test); Defendants'
Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-30, (No. 94-1079) (contending that the LLC interests at issue
are not investment contracts, but focusing only on the efforts of others element of the Howey test).
The Howey test for an investment contract is set forth in the text accompanying supra notes 122-
23.
238. See text accompanying supra notes 158-63 for court interpretations of the Howey test's
"solely from the efforts of others" prong.
239. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5; SARGENT HANDBOOK,
supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-11.
240. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4; SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-10; Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 13, 1994
WL 326868 (No. 94-0615); Defendants Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079).
Commentators and LLC promoters cite cases such as Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership,
902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990) (whether the interest is a security turns on the partnership
agreement); Reeves v. Teuscher, 881 F.2d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1989) (observing that "the proper
focus must be on the partnership agreement and not how ... the entity functioned"); Rivanna
Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1988) (interest
not a security because the partnership agreement conferred broad authority to manage and control
the business); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.) (must read the statute and the
private agreement to determine legal powers vested), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Odom v.
Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (indicating that the issue is whether the general partner
had power under the partnership agreement and state partnership laws).
241. Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 14, (No. 94-1079) (citing Banghart, 902
F.2d at 808); see also Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986); 1 RIBSTEIN &
KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4 (the general partnership form is close to a per se
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nership interest is an investment contract has a difficult burden to over-
come.242 These commentators and LLC promoters assert that LLCs are close-
ly analogous to general partnerships. 243 They claim LLCs share the same crit-
ical features as general partnerships.2 " In both entities, investors have the
power to participate in the management of the entity.245 Most LLC statutes,
for example, provide that the LLC will be member-managed unless the articles
of organization provide otherwise."l LLC members normally have the power
to elect and remove managers.2 47 LLC members also have the authority to
bind the entity.2" Moreover, there are tax risks associated with delegating
authority to managers which create an incentive for member-management.
249
Since both LLCs and general partnerships allow for investor participation in
management decision-making, they argue that profits are not expected solely
or substantially from the efforts of others; therefore, there should be a strong
presumption against characterizing LLC interests as securities under the
Howey investment contract test.
250
In support of their position that LLC interests should not be treated as
securities, LLC promoters have relied on cases that have held that general
partnership interests were not securities because the partners had the power to
manage the business either under the state partnership statute or the partner-
ship agreement.51 These courts reason that such investors do not require the
protection of the securities laws because the investors have the ability to take
care of their own interests due to the inherent powers such investors have
nonsecurity); SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-10 ("General partnership inter-
ests are virtually presumed not to be securities .... ").
242. See, e.g., Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346; Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 425 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
243. See, e.g., I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-3 to 14-4; SARGENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
244. See supra note 243.
245. See supra note 243.
246. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 1.05, at 1-4; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note
I, § 4.02[1], at 4-11; Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 390.
247. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
248. Id.
249. Internal Revenue Service Treasury Regulations use certain characteristics to distinguish
entities treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes from entities treated as associations
taxable as corporations. Those characteristics include: (i) continuity of life; (ii) centralized man-
agement; (iii) limited liability; and (iv) free transferability of interests. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2
(as amended in 1993). A business organization is treated as a corporation and not a partnership for
federal income tax purposes if it has at least three of these characteristics. See id.; see also
Ribstein, supra note 7, at 820-21. As a result, to be classified as a partnership, the entity must
lack at least two of these characteristics. Daniel S. Goldberg, The Tax Treatment of Limited Lia-
bility Companies: Law in Search of Policy, 50 BUS. LAW. 995, 1000 (1995). Since LLCs have
limited liability, a centrally-managed LLC would have to lack both continuity of life and free
transferability for partnership tax treatment. Given the uncertainty surrounding these
characteristics, centrally-managed LLCs would run a greater risk of being denied partnership tax
treatment. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 820-21; Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1077-78.
250. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[l], at 4-11; Defendants' Memorandum in
Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079).
251. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 13-22, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 13-14, (No. 94-1079). For the cases typically
cited by such LLC promoters, see supra note 240.
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under state law or the partnership agreement.252 For example, general part-
ners may act on behalf of the partnership and bind other partners by their ac-
tions.253 General partners are personally liable for the liabilities of the part-
nership, and they may dissolve the partnership.
254
Citing general partnership cases, LLC promoters argue that the power to
exercise managerial control is determinative, regardless of the control actually
exercised. 255 The mere delegation of management control does not create a
security.256 So even if the LLC member does not participate in the manage-
ment of the business, the retention of control under a statute, the articles of
organization, or the operating agreement precludes finding a security. LLC
promoters often set forth a litany of examples to illustrate LLC members re-
tained the legal right to manage the entity, despite the delegation of authority
to a management group. In Vision Communications, for example, the LLC
promoters cited, among other things, the fact that members had the express
authority under the operating agreement: (i) to convert the manager-managed
LLC to a member-managed LLC; (ii) to terminate the management agreement;
(iii) to elect managers; and (iv) to participate in the management and control
of the LLC in proportion to the number of membership interests owned." 7 In
Parkersburg, the LLC promoters cited, among other things, that the operating
agreement provided: (i) each member had the right to participate in the man-
agement and control of the company in proportion to the number of member-
ship interests owned; (ii) members had the power to remove managers; (iii)
unanimous consent of the members was required for dissolution; and (iv) ma-
jority consent was required for acquisition or disposition of any license or
equity interest in entities owning and operating wireless cable systems.2 58
Prosecutors counter that the grant of certain management powers to mem-
bers should not immunize an LLC from charges that its interests are securi-
ties.259 Even if there were a presumption that such interests were not securi-
ties, in the general partnership cases courts have held that the presumption
may be overcome when a Williamson-type analysis indicates the investor is so
unsophisticated, inexperienced, uninformed, or dependent on others that the
investor is unable to exercise meaningful control.2' As a result, the
252. See, e.g., Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1990);
Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1988)
(quoting Williamson); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984).
256. See, e.g., Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 240-41; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Sloan, 394 F.
Supp. 1303, 1314 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("The fact that a partner may choose to delegate his day-to-day
managerial responsibilities to a committee does not diminish in the least his legal right to a voice
in partnership matters, nor his responsibility under state law for acts of the partnership.").
257. See Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
258. See Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079).
259. See supra notes 184-208 and accompanying text.
260. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11; see Williamson v. Tucker, 645
F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
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investor's ability to exercise meaningful control is determinative, not merely
the grant of such control.
LLC promoters respond that the knowledge and sophistication of an indi-
vidual member should not determine whether an interest is a security.261
First, if the knowledge and sophistication of an individual member is determi-
native, whether a promoter is selling a security would turn on the identity of
the purchaser.2 62 This would unduly burden promoters by requiring them to
investigate the business experience and knowledge of all potential investors.
Such a litmus test would create uncertainty. Also, the promoter could find
himself offering a security to some investors (the "unsophisticated" investors),
but offering a nonsecurity to other investors (the "knowledgeable and sophisti-
cated" investors). Second, in the general partnership cases, courts have indicat-
ed that investors who lack financial sophistication or expertise may still exer-
cise meaningful control, because they are free to consult with more knowl-
edgeable investors or third persons, or to employ accountants and lawyers.263
Consequently, an individual's business sophistication should not be determina-
tive.
On theoretical grounds, Professor Larry Ribstein argues that courts should
strongly presume LLC interests are not securities.26 Professor Ribstein criti-
cizes the Howey approach and other cases which emphasize "economic reali-
ty" and "substance-over-form" because such tests require courts to conduct a
fact-specific inquiry into each transaction.26 Such tests become subjective
and often lead to anomalous results.266 Consequently, neither investors nor
issuers know without litigation whether the securities laws apply.267 This un-
predictability increases litigation, makes it difficult for parties to make and
price contracts, decreases the probability of settling disputes without litigation,
and inhibits capital formation.26 Professor Ribstein asserts that the form of
the investment, rather than the substance or economic reality, should determine
whether an interest is a security.26 A strong presumption that LLC interests
are not securities would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation,
and decrease associated costs.27 Moreover, a presumption based on the form
261. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 20-21, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615).
262. Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 729 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing this issue in connection
with whether a general partnership interest is a security); Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 241 n.7 (also in
connection with general partnership interests).
263. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 21 n.5, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-
0615); see also Banghart, 902 F.2d at 808 n.5 (citing Rivanna); Rivanna, 840 F.2d at 242 n.10.
264. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 810.
265. Id. at 809, 828-29.
266. See Schneider, supra note 128, at 107-08 (noting the results-orientation of courts);
Schneider, supra note 134, at 122-27 (noting that the Howey test gives courts the power to reach
any outcome the court desires in a given case and detailing the various factors that appear to
affect court decisions).
267. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 809.
268. Id. at 809, 828-31.
269. Id. at 810, 824.
270. Id. at 824-32; see also Park McGinty, What Is a Security?, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1033,
1082 (noting that "[plresumptions are the most effective method for providing predictability" and
creating settled expectations).
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of the transaction allows the parties themselves to determine the amount of
disclosure necessary and whether the securities laws apply.
2 7'
3. Conclusions
Clearly, LLC interests can be securities under the Howey investment con-
tract test. 72 Whether a particular LLC interest is a security under the Howey
test is a factual question which must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis that
typically will focus on whether profits are expected from the efforts of oth-
ers.
2 73
By comparing LLCs to general partnerships, limited partnerships, and
corporations, commentators and litigators appear to have missed the mark. The
LLC is a hybrid entity that is highly tailorable and flexible.274 LLC statutes
permit prohmoters to structure an entity so that it may have the characteristics
of a general partnership, limited partnership, or corporation, sometimes with
characteristics of each.2 5 The LLC statutes purposefully permit a wide spec-
trum of member participation and control. 276 As a result, any attempt to gen-
eralize or base presumptions on comparisons to other types of legal entities is
doomed to be inaccurate and lead to undesirable results.
In particular, the preoccupation with applying general partnership case
law277 to LLCs appears misguided. While LLC promoters and some com-
mentators would have us believe all LLCs are analogous to general partner-
ships,2 78 LLCs differ from general partnerships in at least two critical
repects.2 79 First, an LLC member has only limited liability for the debts and
obligations of the LLC,280 whereas a general partner has unlimited personal
liability for the debts and obligations of the general partnership."' Unlimited
personal liability gives a general partner the incentive to be highly informed
about the business and the motivation to be actively involved in the manage-
ment of the general partnership. The risk of unlimited personal liability also
discourages involvement by unsophisticated investors."2 In comparison, an
LLC member's liability is limited to his or her investment.2"3 Members are
not personally liable for the debts and obligations of the LLC. In this respect,
members are more like corporate shareholders284 than general partners. So
271. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 812.
272. See supra part III.A.I.
273. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
274. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 1-3 to 1-4.
275. Id.
276. Id. § 4.02[l], at 4-11.
277. Both prosecutors and LLC promoters cite general partnership case law in support of their
respective positions. See supra notes 195-208, 251-56 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
279. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 816-17 (discussing the differences between general
partnerships and LLCs, including investor liability and management structure).
280. LLC members normally are not liable for obligations of the LLC, except to the extent
that they personally guarantee the debts of the LLC. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, §
3.06[l][b]; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 12.02.
281. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 3.0212][a].
282. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 404.
283. See supra note 280.
284. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 3.04[1][a] (noting that "[slhareholders are not
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LLC members have less incentive than general partners to investigate or ac-
tively participate in the management of the business."8 5 LLC members there-
fore are more likely than general partners to be passive investors, less in-
formed, less sophisticated, and more dependent on the efforts of others.286
Second, the LLC statutes provide a formal structure that permits central-
ized management." 7 LLCs can easily adopt a corporate or limited partner-
ship centralized-management structure in lieu of an investor-managed general
partnership structure. An investor in an LLC with centralized management
would not expect to participate in management to the same extent as he would
in a general partnership.' These differences between LLCs and general
partnerships promote passive investment and reliance on the efforts of others,
major factors that affect whether an interest is a security. Moreover, the en-
forcement actions to date demonstrate that even when an LLC adopts a mem-
ber-managed structure, all investors may not be actively involved in the man-
agement of the LLC. Courts therefore should not assume that all LLCs are
analogous to general partnerships and that all investors are actively involved in
the management of the LLC.
In addition, the legal powers granted LLC members do not necessarily
bestow meaningful management control. The legal powers granted to LLC
members may be no more than the legal powers granted to corporate
shareholders.'89 In the Vision Communications and Parkersburg cases, LLC
promoters claimed LLC members had the power to control the entity because,
among other things, LLC members could vote to elect or remove managers
and vote on extraordinary decisions, such as amending the articles of organiza-
tion, dissolution, and the sale of all or substantially all the LLC's assets."9
liable for the debts of the corporation").
285. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 816-17.
286. Professor Mark Sargent dismisses the liability distinction argument as merely a formalis-
tic distinction:
As a practical matter, investors in such enterprises-whatever the form of business orga-
nization-all have substantial incentives "to be highly informed about the business" be-
cause their investment is likely to represent a large percentage of their personal wealth,
because their position is illiquid since there is no real secondary market for their inter-
ests, and because they have often personally guaranteed the business's obligations. It is
also by no means clear that the general partnership's lack of limited liability either en-
courages or discourages "unsophisticated investors." Many unsophisticated investors are
attracted to the general partnership form because of its relative simplicity. This purported
distinction between the incentives of general partners and LLC investors thus has little
bearing on the question of whether LLC members are more or less dependent on the
efforts of others, and thus does not undermine our basic conclusion: LLC interests
should be presumed not to be investment contracts under the Howey test.
SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-13; see also Ribstein, supra note 7, at 822-23
(arguing that the differences in liability should not make a critical difference in applying the secu-
rities laws).
287. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 817. "Some LLC statutes provide for corporate-type cen-
tralized management." Id. Other LLC statutes allow LLC members to "elect to be centrally-man-
aged in their articles of organization or operating agreement." Id.; see supra notes 167-69 and ac-
companying text.
288. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 817.
289. See, e.g., Long, supra note 7, at 112-13 (discussing the rights possessed by the members
of Cellvision, a Texas limited liability company).
290. Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615);
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Such legal rights do not necessarily constitute management control. In effect,
these LLC members have no greater rights than most corporate shareholders.
Corporate shareholders are allowed to vote to remove directors and are typi-
cally granted the right to vote on similar extraordinary corporate matters.,9
A shareholder's possession of such rights usually is not viewed as constituting
legal control or participation in the management of the corporation, particular-
ly when he is only one of many shareholders. His shares of stock are securi-
ties. Why then should the grant of such rights change an LLC interest from a
security to a nonsecurity?
Courts should resist playing into the hands of LLC promoters by applying
general partnership case law to determine whether an LLC interest is a securi-
ty. If you start with the premise that general partnership cases are controlling,
prosecutors and civil plaintiffs begin with three strikes against them: (i) a
"strong presumption" the interests are not securities;"2 (ii) a "difficult bur-
den to overcome";293 and (iii) a narrow Williamson-type exception that al-
lows the presumption to be overcome in only limited circumstances by show-
ing the member is so unsophisticated, uninformed, or dominated that he is
wholly dependent on the manager, or by showing deferral of authority to the
manager is so extreme that members essentially have no control." 4 Since
LLCs differ from general partnerships in several important repects and the
legal powers granted to members may be no more than the corporate power
granted to shareholders, there is no reason to saddle prosecutors and plaintiffs
with the burdens and baggage of general partnership case law. The Howey in-
vestment contract test requires a case-by-case analysis.29 There are no pre-
sumptions. There are no narrow exceptions. The test is simply whether there is
an investment of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of prof-
its from the efforts of others.
Moreover, the presumptions used in partnership cases, that an interest in a
general partnership is not a security and an interest in a limited partnership is
a security, 2" are proving less and less useful to courts. Under a Williamson-
type analysis, courts may find general partnership interests are securities.? 7
Revisions to state limited partnership laws now allow limited partners to enjoy
some of the same rights traditionally possessed only by general partners. 8
As a result, certain limited partnership interests may not be securities.2
Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079).
291. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONs 511-12, 957 (3d ed.
1983); Long, supra note 7, at 113.
292. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
294. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[1], at 4-11.
295. See supra notes 123, 165 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 175-80 (limited partnership interests), 241-42 (general partnership inter-
ests) and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text; see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra
note 99, at 958-59 & n.203.
298. Conrad E.J. Everhard, The Limited Partnership Interest: Is It a Security? Changing
Times, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 441, 482 (1992); see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 959
n.203, 960 & n.204, 961 n.211.
299. Everhard, supra note 298, at 466-68.
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These presumptions are losing their relevance. Instead, courts must analyze
each partnership on a case-by-case basis. So why attempt to impose presump-
tions that are not determinative or necessarily useful in partnership cases in
LLC cases? Furthermore, the courts' inability to clearly specify the character-
istics which can overcome such presumptions creates practical problems in
terms of application and anomalous results.
Applying general partnership case law to LLCs does not appear to be a
satisfactory solution on theoretical grounds either. The strict literalist approach
some federal courts have taken in general partnership cases has been criticized
for focusing on the form of the transaction and legal powers retained by inves-
tors, rather than the economic reality of the transaction."" LLC promoters
tend to cite cases such as Rivanna, Banghart, and Goodwin in support of their
contention that the legal power to control an entity should determine whether
an interest is a security."' But such cases look to the form of the transac-
tion," 2 which is contrary to the Supreme Court's constant admonishments to
look at substance rather than form.33 Courts have begun to reject or limit the
prior authority that focused on form and restricted the scope of the "efforts of
others" inquiry to the legal powers retained by investors.34 Now the trend is
to recognize that investor control depends not only on the form of the transac-
tion and legal powers granted in the documents, but the investor's actual abili-
ty and opportunity to exercise management powers." 5 Courts have begun to
return to this case-by-case "economic realities" approach.
To date, commentators, prosecutors, and LLC promoters have all overem-
phasized the provisions in the articles of organization and the operating
agreements." The undue emphasis on the grant of power is not only at odds
with prior Supreme Court precedent, 30 7 but invites promoters to try to escape
the securities laws by merely parceling out duties to investors and using
300. See, e.g., Douglas M. Branson & Karl S. Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and
the Definition of "Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1076-77 (1993).
301. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 255.
303. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328
U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
304. See, e.g., Koch v. Hankins, 928 F.2d 1471, 1475-81 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the district
court's reliance on Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1988), and stating, "[tlhe question of
investor's control .. .is decided in terms of practical as well as legal ability to control"); Bailey
v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 921-25 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1990) (questioning the district
court's application of Rivanna Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th
Cir. 1988) and holding that the district court improperly limited its examination to the language of
the contracts and should have considered the practical limitations on the investor's ability to exer-
cise meaningful control). Also, the Tenth Circuit case, Banghart, relies on the Matek decision
which has been undercut and discredited by more recent Ninth Circuit opinions such as Holden v.
Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992); Koch, 928 F.2d at 1475-81; Hocking v. Dubois,
885 F.2d 1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1078 (1990). See Banghart, 902 F.2d
at 808 (citing Matek and Rivanna). For a discussion of the trends in general partnership case law,
see Branson & Okamoto, supra note 300, at 1076-88.
305. See Everhard, supra note 298, at 448-49; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 11 1-12.
306. For example, see the following discussions focusing on provisions in the articles of orga-
nization and operating agreements: Defendants' Memorandum in Vision at 17-19, 1994 WL
326868 (No. 94-0615); Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 15-18, (No. 94-1079);
Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1112-13.
307. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
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boilerplate provisions to protect against securities law violations." 8 Promot-
ers should not be allowed to hide behind documents that grant powers that are
not intended to be used, cannot practically be used, or have never been
used." A strict contractual interpretation of documents results in a mechan-
ical, underinclusive, and unduly restrictive view of a security that frustrates the
remedial purposes of the securities laws."' The key issue in the Howey test
is whether the investor in the LLC is led to expect profits from the entrepre-
neurial or managerial efforts of others, not the legal power retained.
The United States Supreme Court has not yet considered whether general
partnership interests are securities or whether any presumptions are warranted.
Given the limited usefulness of these presumptions in partnership cases,"'
the inappropriate focus they place on the form of the transaction and the legal
rights retained by investors," 2 the practical problems with clearly specifying
the characteristics which can overcome such presumptions, and the potential to
frustrate the remedial purposes of the securities laws,3 3 it appears applying
general partnership case law to LLCs does not present a satisfactory solution
from either a practical or theoretical standpoint. For the securities laws to keep
pace with ever-changing investment structures, the courts must return to the
basic premise of the Howey test which requires case-by-case analysis and a
focus on the economic realities. 3 4
Professor Ribstein advocates on theoretical grounds that there should be a
strong presumption LLCs are not securities. 35 He claims such a presumption
would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation, decrease the cost
of capital formation, and allow parties themselves to determine whether the
securities laws apply by their choice of entity." 6 But such a presumption sac-
rifices investor protection to save costs and provide docket control. Legisla-
tures passed securities acts to provide broad investor protection." 7 In Howey,
the Supreme Court stated investor protection should not be thwarted by formu-
las3"8 and instead adopted a case-by-case analysis approach.3"9 A strong
presumption for convenience and cost-cutting is the type of formula the Su-
preme Court attempted to avoid with Howey.
308. See SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir.) (discussion in connec-
tion with analysis of licenses for sale), cert. denied sub nom. Hecht v. SEC, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Probst v. State, 807 P.2d 279, 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (discussion in connection with
analysis of limited partnership interest).
309. Probst, 807 P.2d at 285.
310. Id. at 288 (Lane, J., concurring).
311. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 300-04 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 300-10 and accompanying text.
314. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975) (stating that in
applying Howey and determining what is an investment contract we "must examine the sub-
stance-the economic realities of the transaction-rather than the names that may have been em-
ployed by the parties"); accord International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558
(1979); see also supra note 303.
315. See supra notes 264-67 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
317. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
318. Id.
319. See id. at 298-301.
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A strong presumption that LLCs are not securities would allow promoters
to choose to avoid the securities laws by choosing the form of the legal enti-
ty. 2 Such a presumption could affect a promoter's choice of entity decision
by providing promoters with an incentive to form an LLC rather than a corpo-
ration. Moreover, such a presumption would encourage every dishonest pro-
moter to structure his transactions as an LLC.32" ' State regulators already
charge that many promoters are now packaging their investment products as
LLCs in an attempt to avoid state and federal securities laws.322 If, as Profes-
sor Ribstein advocates, the courts allow private ordering, 2 ' who will suffer?
Private ordering invites fraudulent promoters to prey on the unsophisticated
and uninformed. The effect of such a presumption is to leave those investors
who are least able to protect themselves vulnerable to the schemes of clever
promoters.
If there is a need for a clear, predictable rule to reduce litigation and
decrease the cost of capital formation, a presumption that LLC interests are
securities would better serve the purposes of the securities laws than a pre-
sumption that LLC interests are not securities. The hybrid nature of the entity,
the wide variations in the number of investors and management structure, and
the potential for abuse compel such a conclusion. A presumption that LLC
interests are securities would provide a clear, predictable rule. 2' Parties
could better predict the outcome of litigation. This would reduce litigation and
make it easier for parties to make and price contracts. As for the cost of com-
plying with the securities laws, for many ventures the cost would be minimal.
If the number of LLC members are limited and all members are active and
well-informed, such an offering usually would qualify for an exemption from
the registration provisions of the securities acts.32 In many situations, the
320. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 810, 812 (advocating a "private ordering" approach where
parties could determine whether the securities laws applied by selecting the form of the transac-
tion).
321. Cf. Branson & Okamoto, supra note 300, at 1081 (observing that once courts began
presuming general partnership interests were not securities, "[elvery promoter who knew what she
was doing, or who had a decently schooled transactional lawyer, structured their deal as a general
partnership").
322. Emshwiller, supra note 5; Emshwiller, supra note 11.
323. For a discussion of the "private ordering approach" advocated by Professor Ribstein
which would allow private parties to determine whether the securities laws apply, see Ribstein,
supra note 7, at 812; Larry E. Ribstein, Private Ordering and the Securities Laws: The Case of
General Partnerships, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1992).
324. See Ribstein, supra note 7, at 838-40 (recognizing that changing the definition of a secu-
rity to include LLCs would reduce predictability problems and litigation costs).
325. Such LLC interests would probably be exempt from registration requirements under the
Securities Act as a nonpublic offering, limited offering, or intrastate offering. For a discussion of
federal registration exemptions and related disclosure requirements, see STEINBERG, supra note
135, §§ 3.01-3.12. For a discussion of state registration exemptions and related disclosure require-
ments, see 12 LONG, supra note 84, at 4-1 to 5-185. As equity securities, the LLC interests would
only be subject to the registration provisions of the Exchange Act if there are 500 or more record
holders. Registration is required under the Exchange Act only for firms that are listed on an ex-
change or have total assets exceeding $5 million and equity securities held by more than 500
persons. 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1994) (making it unlawful to effect any transaction in a security on a
national exchange unless the security is registered under the Exchange Act); 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)
(requiring registration for companies with assets of more than $1 million and held of record by
more than 500 persons); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (1995) (exempts issuers with total assets under $5
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disclosure requirements of the securities acts would either not apply or the acts
would require only limited disclosure." 6 Purchases and sales of LLC inter-
ests, however, would be subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities
laws.3"7 The antifraud provisions provide investors with remedies in the
event of misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit.38 So in most instances, the cost
of complying with the securities laws would be minimal, but the protection
and safeguards provided to investors would be great.3 29 Also, even with the
presumption that LLCs are securities, investors would still be allowed to deter-
mine whether the securities laws apply. If they did not want the securities laws
to apply, they could select the general partnership form, rather than the LLC
form. But more importantly, such a presumption would discourage promoters
from packaging their investment products as LLCs to avoid the securities laws,
encourage compliance with the securities laws, and provide investors greater
protection against fraudulent schemes.
LLC interests clearly can be securities under the Howey investment con-
tract test.330 Because the LLC is a hybrid entity, any attempt to generalize or
base presumptions on comparisons to other types of legal entities is doomed to
be inaccurate and lead to undesirable results. 3 For example, LLCs differ
from general partnerships in a number of critical respects that affect whether
an interest is a security. 32 Courts should resist applying general partnership
case law and its associated presumptions to LLCs.333 Courts should return to
the case-by-case analysis dictated by the Howey investment contract test and
focus on the economic realities of the transaction.334 If there is a need for
presumptions to provide a clear, predictable rule, courts should presume LLC
interests are securities. 35 The costs associated with such a presumption
million from registration). Cf 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.05[3], at 2-51 (suggesting that
if all partnership interests were classified as securities, in most instances, the principal impact
would be that the purchase and sale was subject to the antifraud provisions of the securities laws).
326. For a discussion of the federal disclosure requirements associated with various
exemptions, see STEINBERG, supra note 135, §§ 3.01-3.12. For a discussion of the state disclosure
requirements associated with various exemptions, see 12 LONG, supra note 84, at 4-1 to 5-185.
327. "The anti-fraud provisions ... [of the federal securities laws] apply to all sales of securi-
ties involving interstate commerce or the mails, whether or not the securities are exempt from
registration." STEINBERG, supra note 135, ch. I app. at 6 (quoting "The Work of the SEC," pub-
lished by the SEC in 1982).
328. For a discussion of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act,
see STEINBERG, supra note 135, §§ 6.01-7.12.
329. Contra Goforth, supra note 7, at 1278-88; see also Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at
438-39. After a thoughtful discussion of the benefits and costs of federal securities law regulation,
Professor Goforth concludes that the likely costs of regulation and other potential consequences
far exceed any potential benefits. Goforth, supra note 7, at 1278-88. Professor Sargent argues that
a "rule defining all LLC interests as securities would be overinclusive. It is difficult to justify
imposing all of the consequences of securities status on an entity with a small number of mem-
bers, all of whom are legally and practically capable of participating in control." Sargent Blue
Sky, supra note 7, at 438-39.
330. See supra part III.A. 1.
331. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 279-88 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 292-314 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 303-14 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
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would be minimal in most situations, but the benefits in terms of investor
protection would prove great.
B. Risk Capital Tests
1. Arguments Asserted
A 1993 survey of state securities regulators indicated that some state secu-
rities agencies may have already taken the position, either formally or infor-
mally, that LLC interests may be investment contracts under a risk capital
analysis."6 A number of states 37 have adopted the risk capital test by case
law,338 statute,3 9 or administrative ruling." ° In some jurisdictions, the risk
capital test is used as an alternative to the Howey test to determine what con-
stitutes an "investment contract. 34' In other jurisdictions, the risk capital test
serves as an independent means of defining a security. '2 There is no one
formulation of the test.343 There are many variations. Regardless of the ver-
sion used, the risk capital test is considered broader in scope than the Howey
336. See Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 431.
337. The United States Supreme Court has not adopted the risk capital test. In United Hous.
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975), the Court stated that "[elven if we were inclined to
adopt . . . a 'risk capital' approach we would not apply it in the present case." Id. at 857 n.24.
Also, the federal courts have not generally adopted the risk capital test. STEINBERG, supra note
135, § 2.02, at 24; see, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 483 & n.10 (9th Cir.)
(refusing to apply risk capital test), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); see also Annotation, "Risk
Capital" Test for Determination of Whether Transaction Involves Security, Within Meaning of
Federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 USCS §§ 77a et seq.) and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
USCS §§ 78a et seq.), 68 A.L.R. FED. 89 (indicating the disagreements in the federal courts re-
garding the formulation of the risk capital test, its application, and its applicability) [hereinafter
Annotation].
338. See, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961);
Jaciewicki v. Gordarl Assocs., Inc., 209 S.E.2d 693, 695-97 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Hawaii
Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971); State v. George, 362 N.E.2d 1223, 1226-29 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1975); State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 552-54 (Or.
Ct. App. 1971).
339. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26)
(1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
02(13) (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21.20.005(12) (West 1989).
340. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 130.201(d) (Mar. 26, 1990), IA Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 9l 22,614; Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. No. 66-284 (June 2, 1967), [1961-1971 Transfer Binder]
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 70,747 (applying risk capital test to sale of a franchise); Okla. Sec.
Comm'n Interpretive Op., 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 46,641 (July 3, 1980) (applying risk
capital test to a franchise agreement).
341. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (1994) ("The term 'investment contract' shall
include but is not limited to an investment which holds out the possibility of return on risk capital
...."); Healy, 482 P.2d at 554 ("We hold that the Howey test is not exclusive and that the 'risk
capital' test is also to be used in determining whether a particular financial activity constitutes an
offer of an 'investment contract'....").
342. A number of states define the term "security" to include, among other things, an invest-
ment contract and a form of the risk capital test. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(1) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13)
(Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(l 1), (16) (West 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 21.20.005(12) (West 1989).
343. For example, compare the forms of the risk capital test infra notes 352, 354, 356.
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test.3" Application of the risk capital test often leads to finding a "security"
where the Howey test would hold that no security is present. 4
At least one state no-action letter" and four state administrative deci-
sions347 have cited the risk capital test as possible grounds for finding that an
LLC interest is a security.3" In states that have adopted the risk capital test,
the test may prove particularly important when LLC interests may not be se-
curities under the Howey test. 49 In such states, the risk capital test will usu-
ally provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with an alternative theory for arguing
that certain LLC interests are securities.3 °
Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court first articulated the risk
capital theory in a 1961 opinion, Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski."'
Simply stated, the opinion indicated that a "security" is present under the Cali-
fornia Corporation Code when investors provide "risk capital" for a busi-
ness.352 The Hawaii Supreme Court applied and modified the risk capital the-
ory in a 1971 opinion, State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.3 3' The modified
test required not only a finding of risk capital, but findings that the value
given was induced by an offeror's representations of a valuable benefit, and
344. See infra notes 360-82 and accompanying text.
345. STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 24; see also infra notes 360-90 and accompanying
text.
346. Exemption request-Membership interests in a limited liability company, 2A Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) 46,664 (Okla. Dep't of Sec.) (Aug. 28, 1992) (citing OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 2(s)(16) (Oklahoma's risk capital test)).
347. Georgia Express Action at 44-61, (No. 50-93-0075) (noting that, under Georgia law, the
definition of a security includes both the Howey test and the "risk capital" test, but focusing pri-
marily on the Howey test elements as applied in Georgia, and finding that the LLC interests con-
stituted securities); Illinois Express Action at *11, 1993 WL 566300 (No. 9200106) (noting Illi-
nois Administrative Code Rule 130.201(d) provides a broad risk capital test, but analyzing the
facts and holding that the LLC interests were securities under the Howey test as applied in Illi-
nois); In re Third Mobile Ltd. of Las Vegas, No. 94-03-0018, 1996 WL 28692 (Wash. Sec. Div.)
(Jan. 18, 1996) (stating that the offer and/or sale of investments in the LLC constituted the offer
and/or sale of "an investment contract and/or risk capital"); In re Dallas MobileComm L.C., No.
94-03-0018, 1995 WL 431589 (Wash. Sec. Div.) (July 10, 1995) (stating that the offer and/or sale
of investments in the LLC constituted the offer and/or sale of "an investment contract and/or risk
capital").
348. The authors of the no-action letter and two administrative decisions applied the Howey
test and its progeny to determine whether the LLC interests constituted a security. Because the
administrative hearing officers found the LLC interests in question to be securities under the
Howey test, there was no reason to apply the broader risk capital test. However, by citing the risk
capital test in each of these opinions, the authors are indicating that the risk capital test may be
possible grounds for finding that an LLC interest is a security. See supra notes 346-47.
349. See supra notes 344-45, infra notes 360-90 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
351. 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961).
352. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 203 (1988). In concluding a
membership interest in a country club was a "security," the California Supreme Court stated:
Since the [California Corporation Code] does not make profit to the supplier of capital
the test of what is a security, it seems all the more clear that its objective is to afford
those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives in legiti-
mate ventures whether or not they expect a return on their capital in one form or anoth-
er.
Silver Hills, 361 P.2d at 908-09. The court's emphasis on the investor's advance of "risk capital"
caused the theory to be referred to as the "risk capital" test.
353. 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971).
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that the investor did not receive the right to exercise practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise."'
Since 1971, a number of state courts and state legislatures have adopted
various versions of the risk capital test.35 5 The most common statutory for-
mulation defines a "security" as an "investment of money or money's worth
including goods furnished or services performed in the risk capital of a ven-
ture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the investor
has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of the ven-
ture.
356
354. The Hawaii Supreme Court's version of the risk capital test is based on the risk capital
test suggested by Professor Ronald Coffey in his seminal article, The Economic Realities of a
"Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 377 (1967). In Ha-
waii Market Center, the Hawaii Supreme Court articulated its version of the risk capital test:
[Wle hold that for the purposes of the Hawaii Uniform Securities Act (Modified) an
investment contract is created whenever:
(1) An offeree furnishes initial value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enterprise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's promises or representa-
tions which give rise to a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind,
over and above the initial value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of
the enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over
the managerial decisions of the enterprise.
Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109 (footnote omitted).
355. There are a number of different versions of the risk capital test. For example, compare
the California test set forth supra note 352, the Hawaiian test set forth supra note 354, and the
other various formulations set forth in the cases cited at supra note 338. For an overview of state
applications of the risk capital test see 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3].
356. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13)
(1995) (differs only in that it provides "expectation of profit or some other form of benefit to the
investor"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995) (differs only in that it provides
goods furnished "and/or" services performed); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(12) (West
1989) (differs in that it provides an investment of money or "other consideration," the benefit
must be a "valuable" benefit, and the investor "does not receive the right to exercise practical and
actual control").
The Georgia and Michigan formulations of the risk capital test differ from the more com-
mon statutory version. Georgia defines the term "security" to include, among other things, an in-
vestment contract and provides further:
The term "investment contract" shall include but is not limited to an investment which
holds out the possibility of return on risk capital even though the investor's efforts are
necessary to receive such return if:
(A) Such return is dependant upon essential managerial or sales efforts of the issuer or
its affiliates; and
(B) One of the inducements to invest is the promise of promotional or sales efforts of
the issuer or its affiliates in the investor's behalf; and
(C) The investor shall thereby acquire the right to earn a commission or other compen-
sation from sales of rights to sell goods, services, or other investment contracts of the
issuer or its affiliates.
GA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2(a)(26) (1994). Michigan defines the term "security" to include, among
other things, an investment contract and:
[Alny contractual or quasi contractual arrangement pursuant to which: (1) a person fur-
nishes capital, other than services, to an issuer; (2) a portion of that capital is subjected
to the risks of the issuer's enterprise; (3) the furnishing of that capital is induced by the
representations of an issuer, promoter, or their affiliates which give rise to a reasonable
understanding that a valuable tangible benefit will accrue to the person furnishing the
capital as a result of the operation of the enterprise; (4) the person furnishing the capital
does not intend to be actively involved in the management of the enterprise in a mean-
ingful way; and (5) a promoter or its affiliates anticipate at the time the capital is fur-
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In essence, the risk capital tests are a refinement and an extension of the
Howey investment contract test. Courts adopting the risk capital tests were
seeking a more flexible approach to the definition of a security.357 They were
seeking a formulation that would recognize economic reality and reach the
various schemes whereby promoters go to the public to solicit capital that will
be risked in a business venture.' They hoped to protect the public by re-
quiring registration so that promoters would disclose to potential investors that
their investment would be at risk, and by providing remedies to investors if
promoters failed to comply.3"9
The risk capital tests are expressly broader in scope than the Howey
test.36" First, the Howey test literally requires an investment of money.'
Courts have loosely construed this requirement and found it to include invest-
ments of goods, services, and probably anything that constitutes legal consid-
eration.362 The risk capital tests differ from the Howey test in that they ex-
pressly require only a contribution of something of value.363 Some tests even
explicitly state nonmonetary contributions, such as goods and services, are
sufficient. " So, the tests differ in that the risk capital tests often contain an
expressly broader statement of the type of investment sufficient to meet the
requirement.365
Second, the Howey test requires a court to find a "common enter-
prise."'" Courts have interpreted "common enterprise" as requiring some
pooling of interests or some form of profit-sharing, referred to as horizontal
commonality or vertical commonality.367 The risk capital tests do not use the
phrase "common enterprise.""sas As a result, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
nished, that financial gain may be realized as a result thereof.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(1) (West Supp. 1995)
357. See, e.g., State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 554 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971).
358. See, e.g., State v. Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., Inc., 485 P.2d 105, 109 (Haw. 1971); Silver Hills
Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961).
359. See, e.g., Healy, 482 P.2d at 554.
360. In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the United States Supreme Court
stated, "an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or
scheme whereby a person [1] invests his money [2] in a common enterprise and [3] is led to ex-
pect profits [41 solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party .... Id. at 298-99. For an
extensive discussion of each of the elements of the Howey test, see supra part III.A. I.
361. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
362. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., Hawaii Mkt. Cir., 485 P.2d at 109.
364. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994).
365. At least two commentators maintain that the investment requirement in Howey and the
investment requirement in the risk capital tests are essentially equivalent. 12 LONG, supra note 84,
§ 2.04[3), at 2-156; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[21, at 4-8. While the Howey test
and the risk capital tests may prove equivalent in application, the tests differ in that the applicabil-
ity of the Howey test to ventures where the investment is in a form other than money depends on
a court's continued broad construction of the Howey investment of money requirement. On the
other hand, the applicability of the risk capital test to such a situation is dictated by the express
terms of the test.
366. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
367. For a discussion of the Howey common enterprise requirement, see supra notes 134-40
and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); Hawaii Mkt. Crr., 485 P.2d at 109.
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argue there is no pooling of interest requirement or profit-sharing require-
ment.3" So, the risk capital tests are broader than the Howey test in that a
court may find an interest is a security even if there is no horizontal or verti-
cal commonality, as long as the investor has transferred value to the seller. 7
Third, the Howey test provides that the investor must expect "profits"
from the investment.37" ' The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this
requirement as meaning the investor must be motivated to invest by an antici-
pated return on investment through either capital appreciation or earnings, not
by a desire to use or consume the item purchased." The risk capital tests
are more liberal. They represent a departure from Howey in that they generally
require only that investors be motivated by the expectation of a benefit.373
The benefit can be monetary or nonmonetary, tangible or intangible.374 The
investor can even use or consume the anticipated benefit. For example, courts
and state regulators have found club memberships, hotel reservations, and con-
dominium time-share agreements to involve the sale of a security under risk
capital tests. 75 The broader benefit concept means the risk capital tests apply
to transactions that the Howey test may not cover due to the Howey test's
more restrictive "profits" requirement.
Finally, the Howey test literally requires the investor to expect profits
"solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." '376 Lower federal
courts have rejected a literal interpretation of the word "solely" and simply
require proof that the efforts made by those other than the investors are the
undeniably significant efforts.377 The risk capital tests, on the other hand, ex-
pressly adopt the more liberal version of the efforts of others requirement. The
369. Most commentators agree that under the risk capital tests there is no horizontal common-
ality requirement, and thus no requirement that multiple investors pool their interests. See, e.g.,
THOMAS L. HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.5, at 42 (2d ed.
1990); SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-9; STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02,
at 24. Several commentators have also observed that there is no vertical commonality requirement,
and therefore, no requirement that the promoter and investor share the profits or losses of the
enterprise. HAZEN, supra; see also William J. Carney & Barbara G. Fraser, Defining a "Security":
Georgia's Struggle with the "Risk Capital" Test, 30 EMORY L.J. 73, 111-13 (1981). But see, 12
LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156 (asserting that the concept of "risk capital of an enter-
prise" should be treated the same as the concept of the common enterprise in the Howey test).
370. Carney & Fraser, supra note 369, at 113.
371. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
372. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852-58 (1975). For a discussion of
the Howey expectation of profits requirement, see supra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.
373. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West. Supp. 1995) ("a reasonable un-
derstanding that a valuable tangible benefit will accrue"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16)
(West 1995) ("with the expectation of some benefit to the investor"); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d
at 109 ("a reasonable understanding that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the
initial value, will accrue").
374. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3][a], at 2-156 to 2-157.
375. Id. at 2-157; see, e.g., Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal.
1961) (memberships in country clubs); In re Alaska v. Vacation Int'l, Ltd., [1971-1978 Transfer
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) T 71,294 (Alaska Sec. Div. 1976) (condominium time-share
units); see also Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 186 (Mar. 18, 1975), [1971-1978 Transfer Binder] Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 71,200 (prepaid hotel accommodations).
376. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
377. See, e.g., SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). For a discussion of the Howey test's solely from the efforts of others
requirement, see supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
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risk capital tests do not utilize the qualifier "solely." They require that the
investor either have no direct control or that the investor have no right to exer-
cise practical or actual control.378 Again, the risk capital tests are expressly
broader than the Howey test and eliminate the need for courts to interpret the
Howey "solely" from efforts of others requirement. The risk capital tests make
it clear that the key to finding a security is the amount of practical or actual
control the investor has over the managerial decisions of the venture.
To summarize, the risk capital tests generally are considered more expan-
sive than the Howey investment contract test because: (1) nonmonetary invest-
ments are expressly recognized as sufficient;379 (2) the "common enterprise"
requirement is eliminated;3 . (3) the expectation of "profits" is not required,
only the expectation of a benefit;"' and (4) the efforts of others standard is
expressly relaxed. 2
Given that certain LLC interests can clearly qualify as securities under the
Howey test, 383 there is an even greater probability that a court would charac-
terize an LLC interest as a security under the risk capital theory. Investments
in an LLC typically meet the first three elements of the risk capital tests. Un-
der the risk capital tests, an investor must risk money, property, or services in
a venture with the expectation of some benefit.8 4 An investment in an LLC
normally involves contributing money, property, or services,385 and it is
unlikely an investment in an LLC venture would be risk free. As one com-
mentator noted, LLC investments usually are not collateralized, nor do pro-
moters generally provide fixed rates of return, a guarantee, or priority over
creditors.386 Also, in most situations, an investor contributes to an LLC ex-
pecting some form of benefit in return.38 7 Like the Howey test, the key issue
often will be whether the investor exercises practical or actual control over the
managerial decisions of the enterprise.3"8 However, given the risk capital
theory's focus on economic reality and investor protection,8 9 courts are like-
ly to construe the control element more liberally under the risk capital tests
than under Howey. Due to its broader application and the more liberal con-
378. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.801(l) (West Supp. 1995) ("the person fur-
nishing the capital does not intend to be actively involved in the management of the enterprise in
a meaningful way"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13) (1995) ("the investor has no direct control
over the investment or policy decisions of the venture"); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109 ("the
offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual control over the managerial deci-
sions of the enterprise").
379. See supra notes 361-65 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 366-70 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 376-78 and accompanying text.
383. See supra part III.A.1.
384. See STEINBERG, supra note 135, at 257; see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994);
Hawaii Mkt. Cr., 485 P.2d at 109.
385. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
386. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2], at 4-14.
387. See supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
388. See SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2], at 4-14; see also ALASKA STAT. §
45.55.990(12) (1994); Hawaii Mkt. Ctr., 485 P.2d at 109.
389. See supra notes 357-59 and accompanying text.
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struction, there is an even better chance that courts will characterize LLC
interests as securities under the risk capital theory.3' 9
2. Possible Defenses
Some commentators contend that the risk capital test is not substantially
different than the Howey test.39' First, some commentators argue the invest-
ment element under the risk capital tests is basically equivalent to courts'
liberal construction of the Howey investment of money requirement.392 Sec-
ond, although the risk capital tests do not use the phrase "common enterprise,"
the investment must be risked in some sort of venture.3 93 At least one com-
mentator has argued that the venture or enterprise requirement under the risk
capital tests is essentially the same as the Howey common enterprise require-
ment. 4 Third, even though the expectation of a benefit element under the
risk capital tests is broader than the expectation of profits element under
Howey,395 the benefits element only impacts the few extraordinary situations
where investors do not expect profits in the narrow sense. 96 Finally, to the
extent the risk capital tests require that the investor have no direct control over
the investment or policy decisions of the venture,3 97 some commentators
claim the risk capital tests are simply adopting the liberal construction of the
case law interpreting the phrase "efforts of others" that has developed under
Howey.39 Consequently, application of the broader risk capital tests might
affect a few marginal cases, but essentially the issues and the analysis are the
same.3' 9 Therefore, there should be no greater chance of LLC interests being
characterized as securities in risk capital jurisdictions than under the Howey
test.' m
Very few jurisdictions have adopted the risk capital test to determine the
existence of a security.' Critics of the risk capital test charge that the test is
plagued by limited acceptance, lack of uniformity in its application, and uncer-
tainty about its meaning."° For example, the exact meaning of the key term
"risk capital" still remains unclear.: 3 Does the risk capital test apply when-
390. See STEINBERG, supra note 135, § 2.02, at 24.
391. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-8.
392. Id.; see also 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156.
393. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 2(s)(16) (West 1995) ("investment ... in the risk
capital of a venture"); Hawaii Mkt. Cr., 485 P.2d at 109 ("a portion of this initial value is sub-
jected to the risks of the enterprise").
394. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3], at 2-156 ("The concept of an enterprise under the
risk capital test will be essentially the same as the concept of common enterprise as outlined under
the Howey test.").
395. See supra notes 371-75 and accompanying text.
396. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-9.
397. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-02(13) (1995); Hawaii Mkt. Cir., 485 P.2d at 109.
398. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[4], at 2-166; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1,
§ 4.0112], at 4-8.
399. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.02[2), at 4-14.
400. Id.
401. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text indicating adoption of the risk capital
test in only eleven states. Also, the risk capital test generally is not adopted by the federal courts.
See supra note 337.
402. See, e.g., SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.01[2], at 4-7 to 4-8.
403. 12 LONG, supra note 84, § 2.04[3), at 2-155 to 2-156; SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note
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ever a person invests capital with less than a fair chance of receiving a return
or does the test only apply when capital is invested in a highly risky or unsta-
ble venture? 4 Does the test only apply when a venture is seeking its initial
capitalization"' or does the test apply when an on-going concern is seeking
additional capital?' Decisions are split on the answers to these
questions."' There is no universal understanding as to the tests' application.
LLC promoters therefore may argue that given the ambiguity created by the
risk capital tests, the relative lack of case law, and the fact that the tests are
merely a refinement of the Howey test, courts should be guided by the Howey
line of cases. Specifically, courts should draw on the Howey general partner-
ship cases to interpret the control element and adopt a strong presumption
against characterizing LLC interests as securities.' LLC promoters may
contend that courts have no basis for adopting a more liberal interpretation of
the control element under the risk capital tests than under the Howey test.4
Further, on theoretical grounds, a strong presumption that LLC interests are
not securities would provide a clear and predictable rule, reduce litigation, and




Clearly, certain LLC interests may be securities under a risk capital
analysis.4 ' In states that have adopted risk capital tests, 41
2 the tests will
usually provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with an alternative theory for argu-
ing certain LLC interests are securities.4 3 While the risk capital tests focus
1, § 4.01[21, at 4-9; Louis C. Novak & Howard Rosten, Note, Franchise Regulation Under the
California Corporate Securities Law, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 140, 152-55 (1968).
404. Novak & Rosten, supra note 403, at 152-55. Compare Silver Hills Country Club v.
Sobieski, 361 P.2d 906, 908-09 (Cal. 1961) (stating that the objective of the risk capital test is "to
afford those who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives") with Mr.
Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 640, 647 (D. Colo. 1970) (arguing that the bet-
ter view is to limit the applicability of the risk capital test to exceptionally high risk, speculative
ventures), affd, 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972). For other cases interpreting the risk requirement,
see Annotation, supra note 337, § 3[a].
405. See, e.g., State ex rel. Healy v. Consumer Business Sys., Inc., 482 P.2d 549, 555 (Or. Ct.
App. 1971) ("Under the 'risk capital' test we are concerned with whether the franchisor is depen-
dent upon the franchisees' capital to initiate his operations, not just manufacture his product.").
406. See, e.g., State ex rel. Park v. Glenn Turner Enters., Inc., [1971-1978 Transfer Binder]
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9171,023 (Idaho Dist. 1972).
407. See supra notes 404-06 and accompanying text.
408. For a discussion of the Howey line of cases dealing with general partnership interests
and related presumptions see supra notes 240-54 and accompanying text.
409. LLC promoters may argue that the language in some risk capital tests is even more re-
strictive than the more liberal control test adopted by most courts under Howey. Compare WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.005(12) (West 1989) (stating that "the investor does not receive the
right to exercise practical or actual control over the managerial decisions of the venture") with
SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) (requiring proof that "the
efforts made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential
managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise"), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973).
410. For a discussion of the arguments that on theoretical grounds there should be a strong
presumption that LLC interests are not securities, see supra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
411. See supra notes 384-88 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
413. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
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on some of the same criteria as the Howey test, they are explicitly broader in
scope.4 4 The risk capital tests expressly apply to transactions that the Howey
test does not reach.4 " The risk capital tests also eliminate the need for liberal
judicial construction, which is often required to find that a security is present
under the Howey test."16 As a result, application of the risk capital tests may
lead to finding an LLC interest is a security, where the Howey test would hold
no security is present.
In most cases, an investment in an LLC will satisfy the first three ele-
ments of the risk capital tests.417 Most LLC investors risk money, property,
or services in an LLC venture, expecting a benefit in return. Like Howey, the
critical issue will be whether the investor exercises practical or actual control
over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.18 Since there is lack of uni-
formity and some ambiguity in applying the risk capital tests,"9 courts have
the opportunity to refine and develop the definition of a security under these
tests. In applying the risk capital tests to LLCs, courts are not required to
follow the general partnership case law that evolved under Howey nor adopt
the associated presumptions. Courts are free to construe the risk capital tests
liberally and adopt flexible constructions designed to protect investors against
fraud and clever new schemes devised by promoters to evade the securities
laws.
C. Characteristics of Stock Test
1. Arguments Asserted
Commentators42 ° and at least two state securities commissions"' have
asserted that certain LLC interests may be securities under the characteristics
of stock test set forth in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth.2 In Landreth,
the United States Supreme Court held that if an instrument bears the label
414. See supra notes 360-82 and accompanying text.
415. See supra notes 361-82 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 362-65, 371-78 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 384-87 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 388, 397-98 and accompanying text.
419. See supra notes 402-07 and accompanying text.
420. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 36-40.
421. Limited liability company interests as securities, 2A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 54,521
(Tenn. Mar. 7, 1995) (stating that if an LLC interest possesses the characteristics of stock set forth
in Landreth, it is the Tennessee Division of Securities' position that the interest is a security)
[hereinafter Tennessee Statement of Policy]; see Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075)
(stating that the Georgia Commissioner of Securities urged the referee to apply the test traditional-
ly used to determine whether a particular investment constitutes stock to determine whether an
LLC interest is a security). Also, in a request for an interpretive opinion from the Maryland Secu-
rities Division, an LLC issuer argued that the LLC interests at issue were not securities because,
among other things, the interests bore no resemblance to stock as characterized by the Tcherepnin,
Landreth, and Forman Courts. Exemption request-Whether membership interests in a limited
liability company are required to be registered, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 30,579 (Md. Sec.
Comm'r) (Apr. 25, 1994). The Maryland Securities Division stated that it would take no action to
require the registration of the LLC interests in question, but the Division did not state the grounds
for its decision. Id.
422. 471 U.S. 681 (1985). The SEC did not raise this argument in Vision Communications,
Parkersburg, or Knoxville.
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"stock" and possesses all the characteristics typically associated with stock, the
securities laws apply.423 The Court did note, however, that the instrument's
label is not determinative.424 The key inquiry is whether the instrument bears
the attributes usually associated with stock, meaning: (i) the right to receive
dividends upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability
to be pledged; (iv) voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned;
and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value.42
Professor Marc Steinberg maintains that LLC interests ordinarily possess
the five attributes commonly associated with stock.426 First, since LLC stat-
utes generally provide for the distribution of profits to members based on
capital contribution,427 owners of an LLC often have the right to receive div-
idends upon the apportionment of profits. Second, LLC statutes allow mem-
bers to transfer or assign their LLC interests, therefore LLC interests are nego-
tiable.428 Third, an LLC interest is personal property and as such may be
pledged.429 Fourth, most LLC statutes vest management in the members, un-
less the LLC operating documents provide otherwise.43 Voting rights are
usually determined in proportion to the member's capital contribution, so
members have voting rights. 3 Fifth, LLC interests may increase in val-
ue.432 Professor Steinberg and other commentators have argued that because
"companies" issue LLC interests and companies typically issue stock to evi-
dence an equity interest, investors expect such interests to be governed by the
securities laws.433 They assert substance should prevail over form and la-
bels. 434 If LLC interests possess the five attributes usually associated with
stock, such interests should be deemed securities.435
At least one state securities commission has taken the position that LLC
interests may be securities under the characteristics of stock test set forth in
Landreth. In a Statement of Policy, the Tennessee Division of Securities stated
423. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985)
(applying the standard from Landreth).
424. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
848-51 (1975) (stating that the emphasis should be on "economic reality").
425. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 686; see also Gould, 471 U.S. at 704; Forman, 421 U.S. at 851.
426. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 37-39.
427. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116-17; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 1, § 5.02, at 5-2 (stating that financial rights in LLCs are generally based on members' capi-
tal contributions).
428. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117-19; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra
note 1, § 7.04, at 7-4 (stating that LLC statutes provide for transfer and assignment of membership
interests).
429. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119; see also Donn, supra note 1, § 12, at PGLLC-
40 (stating that the general rule in all the state LLC acts is that an LLC interest is personal proper-
ty).
430. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117; see also Donn, supra note 1, § 10, at PGLLC-
36 (stating that generally management is vested in the members).
431. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1117; see also I RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1,
§ 8.03, at 8-8.
432. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119.
433. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40
(on their face LLCs appear to be nothing more than traditional corporations with a different set of
descriptive terms).
434. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40.
435. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-40.
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that it believes LLC interests should be analyzed under Landreth."" The Di-
vision takes the position that if an LLC interest possesses the five attributes
usually associated with stock, the LLC interests could be labeled "stock"
which is a security under Tennessee law.437 If an LLC interest possesses the
five attributes usually associated with stock, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
argue, citing Landreth and the authorities and arguments outlined above, such
LLC interests should be deemed securities.
2. Possible Defenses
The Kansas Securities Commissioner and a trier of fact in an administra-
tive hearing in Georgia considered, but ultimately rejected, the argument that
LLC interests should be considered securities because they possess the char-
acteristics of stock.43 "Stock" is one of the many financial instruments listed
expressly in the statutory definitions of a "security.""'  Commentators argue
that each statutory term is susceptible to separate analysis, based on separate
analytical concepts."0 In Landreth, the United States Supreme Court made it
clear that stock may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of
interpreting the scope of the definition of a security."'
In Landreth, as in the other United States Supreme Court decisions deal-
ing with the characteristics of stock test, the interest the Court considered was
labeled "stock.""' 2 LLCs do not issue "stock,""' 3 and LLC statutes do not
refer to LLC interests as "stock."'2 Also, commentators and others do not
refer to LLC interests as "stock.""' 5 The issue therefore becomes whether an
instrument not labeled "stock" could constitute a security under the separate
test the Court devised for "stock."' LLC issuers may argue that Landreth
and the related cases apply only to instruments that are labeled "stock." No-
where, in either Landreth or the other United States Supreme Court decisions,
did the Court indicate that any instrument that possessed the characteristics of
stock constituted a security.'
436. Tennessee Statement of Policy, supra note 421.
437. Id.
438. Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug, L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec. Comm'r)
(May 1, 1991); Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075).
439. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(1) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-
81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995).
440. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 871.
441. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 694 (1985).
442. See id. at 683; Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 702 (1985); United Hous. Found.,
Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975).
443. Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1095; Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116.
444. See, e.g., Donn, supra note 1, § 1, at PGLLC-6 to -7; see generally state limited liability
company statutes, supra note 4.
445. See generally supra note I (commentaries on limited liability companies).
446. See Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec.
Comm'r) (May 1, 1991); see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 36.
447. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 832-33; see, e.g., Gould v. Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701 (1985);
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421
U.S. 837, 848 (1975). But see Peralta, supra note 7, at 36-37 (citing United States Supreme Court
authority and arguing that for an investment to constitute a security as "stock," the word "stock"
itself need not be used).
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Professor Steinberg maintains that the characteristics of stock test should
be applied to LLC interests because "companies" issue such interests and in-
vestors expect such interests to be governed by the securities law.' Critics
assert that the statutory definition of a security does not contain the term
"company."" 9 Further, entities that might be thought of by investors as
"companies" issue most, if not all, financial instruments. The logical extension
of Professor Steinberg's theory would result in applying the characteristics of
stock test to all instruments issued by "companies." Applying the characteris-
tics of stock test to all instruments in the statutory definition of a "security"
that are issued by companies would make the definition's enumeration of the
various types of instruments superfluous. 5° The Supreme Court has also
made it clear that there is no universal or generic test for what constitutes a
security.45 Nevertheless, taking Professor Steinberg's argument to its logical
conclusion would result in a generic test applied to all interests issued by
"companies."
Furthermore, many business people use the term "company" loosely to
refer to partnerships and other joint ventures.452 If the characteristics of stock
test were applied to all such ventures, including general partnerships, most or
at least many of the elements of the characteristics of stock test would be
met.453 Such a result is not consistent with prior precedent holding that cer-
tain general partnership and joint venture interests are not securities.4 4 Some
commentators charge that investors do not expect LLC interests to be "stock"
merely because limited liability companies have the term "company" in their
title,455 thus allowing LLC issuers to argue that investors do not necessarily
expect LLC interests to be covered by the securities laws.456
Professor Larry Ribstein asserts that, even if the Landreth test applies,
LLC interests do not meet the characteristics of stock test. 55 Professor
448. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116.
449. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-5; see also supra notes 98-99
(statutory definitions of a security).
450. Cf Landreth, 471 U.S. at 692 (applying the Howey investment contract test to all instru-
ments would make the statutory enumeration superfluous).
451. 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 871 & n.5; see also Landreth, 471 U.S. at 691-
92.
452. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833.
453. See Interpretive Opinion Orchards Drug L.C., 1991 WL 101804, at *3 (Kan. Sec.
Comm'r) (May 1, 1991).
454. Generally, courts do not treat a general partnership interest as a security, unless the gen-
eral partner is expected to be a passive investor who will not participate in the management of the
business. Schneider, supra note 134, at 138; see, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership,
902 F.2d 805, 807-08 (10th Cir. 1990); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424-25 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). Joint ventures are subject to the same analysis as partnership inter-
ests. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 956 n.200 (citing numerous authorities). The United
States Supreme Court has not considered whether interests in general partnerships or joint ventures
constitute securities.
455. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833.
456. See id.; see also Georgia Express Action at 46, (No. 50-93-0075) (LLC interests do not
appear on their face to be what is commonly known as traditional "stock"); infra discussion part
II1.D (explaining arguments and defenses regarding instruments commonly known as securities).
457. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833; see also Goforth, supra note 7, at 1242-47 (arguing LLC
interests are no more akin to stock than general partnership interests, which have not been found
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Ribstein maintains that LLC statutes do not generally provide for dividend
rights, they invariably restrict transferability of management rights, and they
allow allocation of voting rights per capita rather than pro rata.45 Based on
the arguments and authorities discussed in this section, LLC issuers have a
strong argument that LLC interests should not be deemed securities under the
Landreth characteristics of stock test.
3. Conclusions
Professor Steinberg's argument that LLC interests should be analyzed as
stock because companies issue the interests"'9 is a novel approach. Neverthe-
less, there appears to be no authority to support the application of the charac-
teristics of stock test to instruments other than those labeled "stock."' The
argument is also at odds with the Supreme Court's statement that stock should
be viewed as being in a category by itself." Moreover, the logical extension
of this argument would lead to results inconsistent with prior precedent. 2
Commentators have criticized the characteristics of stock test on theoreti-
cal grounds. Commentators argue the formalistic five-factor Landreth test
elevates form over substance, 3 therefore conflicting with many United
States Supreme Court decisions stating that form should be disregarded for
substance and emphasis placed upon economic reality.' Landreth is viewed
as an anomaly. Some argue that Landreth's precedential value is limited since
it represents a situation where the Court ignored traditional considerations
because it was unwilling to rule that common stock was not a security. 5 In
light of such criticism, there is little reason to broaden the test's application
beyond its narrow purpose to determine whether stock is a security.
From a practical standpoint, if a court applies the characteristics of stock
test to determine whether an LLC interest is a security, the determination
would depend on whether the LLC interest satisfies the Landreth five-factor
test. Professor Steinberg maintains that LLC interests ordinarily satisfy the
test.' Professor Ribstein, on the other hand, asserts that LLC interests nor-
mally do not meet the test. 7 Given that LLC statutes provide members the
flexibility to tailor the characteristics of the entity,' application of the
to possess the characteristics of stock).
458. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 833; see also Goforth, supra note 7, at 1242-47.
459. See supra notes 433-35 and accompanying text.
460. See supra note 447 and accompanying text.
461. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
463. See, e.g., Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, What Is a Security Under the Fed-
eral Securities Laws?, 56 ALB. L. REV. 473, 559 (1993).
464. Id.; see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); Unit-
ed Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 336 (1967).
465. See, e.g., Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60.
466. See supra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 457-58 and accompanying text.
468. Sargent Article, supra note 7, at 1073-77. For example, LLC distribution provisions,
transfer restrictions, and voting rights allocations may vary depending upon the state of formation
or the provisions in the articles of organization or the operating agreement. See I RIBSTEIN &
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Landreth test to LLC interests would result in a case-by-case analysis. A court
would need to review an LLC's operating agreement and articles of organiza-
tion to determine whether the LLC interest satisfies the test.'
Not only would use of the characteristics of stock test lead to litigation,
but more importantly, it would result in carefully drafted LLC documents
designed to escape the reach of the securities laws by insuring that one of the
elements in the five-factor test is not met. Application of the Landreth test to
LLCs would create an environment where formalistic devices could become
determinative due to the way the test is structured. Moreover, if an LLC inter-
est did not satisfy the elements of the Landreth test, nothing would preclude a
court from applying the investment contract test.47 As such, application of
the Landreth test to LLC interests does not appear to be a satisfactory solution
from either a theoretical or practical standpoint.
D. Commonly Known as a Security
1. Arguments Asserted
The federal securities acts and most state securities acts define the term
"security" to include any "instrument commonly known as a 'security."'' "
At least one commentator has argued that an interest in an LLC constitutes an
interest or instrument "commonly known as a 'security." '472 The phrase
"commonly known as a 'security"' has not generated much litigation473 and
neither the United States Supreme Court nor other federal courts have provid-
ed much guidance on how to interpret the phrase.474 Professor Marc
KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 6.02, at 6-2 (distribution provisions may be customized), § 7.04, at 7-4
to 7-5 (some LLC statutes permit variation of transferability restrictions by contrary provisions in
the articles of organization or operating agreement), and § 8.03, at 8-8 (most states allocate voting
ights according to capital contribution, but several states allocate voting rights per capita).
469. See Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1119.
470. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-58 (1975) (concluding that
the interest did not satisfy the characteristics of stock test, the Court then considered whether the
interest constituted an investment contract).
471. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1994); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401() (1958), 7B U.L.A. 580-
81 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101(16) (1988), 7B U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1995). The Securities Act and
Uniform Securities Acts list any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, while the
Exchange Act lists only any instrument commonly known as a security. However, this distinction
appears to have little practical effect due to the expansiveness of other terms in the Exchange Act.
ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5B LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5, § 38.03[a][i], at 2-155 to
2-156 (1994).
472. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1120-22 (arguing that one can classify an LLC inter-
est as "any interest or instrument commonly known as a security"). The SEC did not make this
argument in its complaints or memorandums to the court in Vision Communications, Parkersburg,
or Knoxville. The triers of fact in the state actions summarized and cited infra Table I did not ex-
pressly address this argument either.
473. 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 209 (Supp. 1994); Geu, Part Two, supra note 1,
at 514.
474. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1967) (criticizing court of appeal's
conclusion that withdrawable capital shares were not an instrument commonly known as a securi-
ty); 5B JACOBS, supra note 471, § 3 8 .03 [q] (discussing how to determine whether an instrument is
"commonly known" as a security)
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Steinberg suggests4"' that to determine what interests or instruments are com-
monly known as securities, courts should: (i) examine the expectations or
perceptions of the investing public, or, alternatively; (ii) apply the family
resemblance test set forth in Reves v. Ernst & Young. 6
a. Public's Expectations
Alluding to the phrase any instrument "commonly known as a 'security,"'
the United States Supreme Court stated, "Congress intended the securities laws
to cover those instruments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securi-
ties in the commercial world . ....,,477 In Forman,4 7' Landreth,479 and
Reves," ° the Court indicated the investing public's expectations or percep-
tions are relevant in determining whether an instrument is a security.' Com-
mentators argue that an investor purchasing an LLC interest would reasonably
expect the transaction to be governed by the securities laws. 2 Investors are
purchasing an equity interest in a "company" and such transactions are typical-
ly subject to the securities laws. s3 Additionally, LLC interests generally pos-
sess the characteristics associated with securities such as stock. 4 Thus, a
reasonable investor would be justified in assuming the securities laws
apply,"' especially since nothing indicates that the securities laws do not ap-
ply. Courts, therefore, should deem an LLC interest to be an interest "com-
monly known as a 'security,"' considering the public's expectation. 6
475. See Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1120-22.
476. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
477. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
478. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, there is dicta
stating that the name given to an instrument might reasonably lead an investor to believe the fed-
eral securities laws apply. The Court noted that the use of traditional names such as "stocks" or
"bonds" will lead the purchaser to justifiably assume the securities laws apply. Id. at 850. But, the
Court held that although the instrument was called "stock," it had none of the characteristics of
stock. The purchaser, therefore, could have no reasonable expectation that his transaction was
covered by the securities law. Id. at 851.
479. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). In Landreth, the Court held that
because the instrument was called "stock" and bore the usual characteristics of stock, the purchas-
er was justified in assuming the federal securities laws governed the purchase. Id. at 687. The
Court, relying on public expectations, held common stock is a security. Id. at 687, 694.
480. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990). In Reves, the Court stated that in deciding
whether a transaction involves a "security" it will examine the "reasonable expectations of the
investing public." Id. at 66. The Court said it "will consider instruments to be 'securities' on the
basis of such public expectations." Id.
481. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 555-57; Steinberg Article, supra note 7,
at 1120; supra notes 478-80.
482. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see Peralta, supra note 7, at 31.
483. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33,
36-40; supra note 433 and accompanying text.
484. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116-19; see also Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33, 36-
40; supra notes 426-32 and accompanying text.
485. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1116, 1120; see Peralta, supra note 7, at 31-33.
486. Cf Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66-67 (1990).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
b. Family Resemblance Test
One can also argue an LLC interest is a security under the family resem-
blance test set forth in Reves." 7 In Reves, the United States Supreme Court
analyzed when a "note" is a security. 8 The Court stated that in deciding
whether a transaction involves a security, the Court examines four factors: (i)
the motivations of the buyer and seller; (ii) the plan of distribution; (iii) the
reasonable expectations of the investing public; and (iv) the presence of other
risk-reducing factors. 9 The Court uses these four factors to identify those
instruments that bear a strong "family resemblance" to items previously identi-
fied as securities.4' If, based on these factors, an LLC interest bears a strong
"family resemblance" to other items previously identified as securities, at least
one commentator has argued courts should deem such LLC interests securities.
In discussing the first factor, motivations, the Court stated that if the sell-
er's purpose is to raise money for general business operations or to finance a
substantial investment and if the buyer is interested primarily in profit, the
instrument is likely to be a security.49 Often LLC interests are sold to raise
seed capital for a venture. Also, LLC investors ordinarily expect a return on
their investment from capital appreciation, earnings, or tax benefits.492 Ap-
plying this analysis, the sale of an LLC interest is likely to meet the first test.
With respect to the second factor, plan of distribution, the Court stated
that if there is common trading for speculation or investment, the instrument is
more likely to be a security.493 Based on the Court's application of this fac-
tor in Reves, the test apparently is satisfied if the instrument is offered to the
general public, even if no secondary trading market exists.494 As a result, if
an LLC interest is offered to the general public, even if there were few
offerees or purchasers, this element apparently is satisfied.49
The Court noted in discussing the third factor, public expectations, that it
will consider instruments to be securities based on the reasonable expectations
or perceptions of the investing public.496 As discussed previously, investors
may be justified in expecting the securities laws to apply to the purchase and
sale of LLC interests. 97 Therefore, the public expectation requirement may
be met.
487. Id. at 65-67. For additional commentary on Reves, see James D. Gordon III, Inter-
planetary Intelligence About Promissory Notes as Securities, 69 TEX. L. REV. 383 (1990); Janet
Kerr & Karen M. Eisenhauser, Reves Revisited, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1123 (1992); Marc 1. Steinberg,
Notes as Securities: Reves and Its Implications, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 675 (1990).
488. Reves, 494 U.S. at 60-73.
489. Id. at 66-67.
490. Id. at 65-67.
491. Id. at 66.
492. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1121 & n.100.
493. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66.
494. See id. at 68; see also Schneider, supra note 134, at 130.
495. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1121 & nn.101-02.
496. Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67.




Finally, the Court noted that the existence of another regulatory scheme
reducing the investor's risk would make the application of the securities laws
unnecessary and militates against the Court finding the interest a security.498
Since no other regulatory scheme governs the offer or sale of LLC interests or
significantly reduces the risk to LLC investors, application of the securities
laws appears necessary.499 Given that LLC interests generally appear to satis-
fy each element of the family resemblance test, prosecutors and plaintiffs may
argue courts should deem LLC interests to be interests "commonly known as a
'security."'
2. Possible Defenses
LLC promoters can make a strong argument that neither the public's ex-
pectations nor the family resemblance test should determine whether an inter-
est is an interest "commonly known as a 'security."' As previously indicated,
the phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' has not generated much litiga-
tion and there is little guidance from the courts on how to interpret the
phrase." There is no precedent indicating the public's expectations alone
should dictate whether an interest is one that is "commonly known as a 'secu-
rity.""'5 " Nor is there any precedent stating that a court should apply the
Reves family resemblance test to determine whether an interest is one "com-
monly known as a 'security.""'5 2 In fact, the United States Supreme Court
indicated that, at least under the facts in Forman, it perceived no distinction
between the test for "investment contract" and the test for "an instrument
commonly known as a 'security.""'5 3 The Court noted that in either case, the
Howey test" should be used to determine whether the transaction involved a
security. 5 Therefore, courts should use the Howey test, rather than a public
expectations test or family resemblance test, to determine whether an interest
or instrument is one "commonly known as a 'security.""'
498. Reves, 494 U.S. at 67.
499. Steinberg Article, supra note 7, at 1122.
500. See supra notes 473-74 and accompanying text.
501. For example, in Reves, Landreth, and Forman, the public's expectations were only one
of a number of factors considered by the Court. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67 (adopting the family
resemblance test and stating that the courts look to the buyers and seller's motivations, the plan of
distribution, and the reasonable expectations of the investing public); Landreth Timber Co. v.
Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685-97 (1985) (stating that the Court often looks to the language of the
statute, the definition of security, the characteristics of the instrument, and the circumstances sur-
rounding the transaction); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-58 (1975)
(considering the statutory definition of security, the purpose of the statute, and the public's expec-
tations).
502. See, e.g., Reves, 494 U.S. at 65-67 (stating that courts are to apply the family resem-
blance test to determine whether a "note" is a "security").
503. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
504. The Howey test, also known as the investment contract test, is set forth and discussed
supra part IIl.A.
505. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852.
506. For a discussion of the Howey investment contract test and an analysis of when an LLC
interest constitutes a security under the Howey test, see supra part III.A.
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a. Public's Expectations
While the Court has indicated the investing public's expectations are rele-
vant to determining whether an instrument is a security, 7 the Court has nev-
er stated the public's expectations are determinative." 8 The public's expecta-
t'ons were only one of many factors considered by the Court in these cas-
es. 5" As a result, the public's expectations alone do not dictate whether an
interest is a security.
Even if the public's expectations determined what interests were "com-
monly known as a 'security,"' LLC promoters may still argue that LLC inter-
ests are not securities. Commentators maintain, given the relatively recent
origin of LLCs, it is unlikely that an LLC interest has reached the status of an
interest "commonly known as a 'security.""'5 " Many investors do not even
know about the LLC form of business organization, let alone whether the
securities laws govern. The phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' appears
more applicable to widely-used instruments, such as stock options.5 ' Also,
given the variety of business arrangements that may utilize the LLC form and
the flexibility under the LLC statutes to vary the structure of the entity," 2 it
is difficult to generalize about such entities. It seems ironic that entities which
cannot be easily characterized because of their uniqueness would be treated as
offering an interest "commonly known as a 'security."' 5
There is no evidence to indicate that investors expect LLC interests to be
securities. Court documents filed in cases where the SEC alleged that LLC
interests constituted securities indicate that the offering documents in these
cases expressly disclosed that the interests did not constitute securities, were
not registered under any securities laws, and were not subject to the protection
of the securities laws." ' Consequently, a reasonable investor would not ex-
pect the protection of the securities laws. Of course, the counter argument is
that a seller may not effect a waiver of the securities laws by simply disclos-
ing that the securities laws do not apply. 5 If the instrument is a security,
the securities laws apply regardless of the disclosures made by the seller.
LLC promoters may also argue that LLCs share many of the characteris-
tics of a general partnership.5 6 Ordinarily, general partnership interests are
507. See supra notes 478-80 and accompanying text.
508. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
509. See supra note 501.
510. Geu, Part Two, supra note 1, at 514.
511. See id.; 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.04 [141; 2 LOss & SELIGMAN, supra note
99, at 1070-7 1.
512. See, e.g., supra note 468 and accompanying text.
513. Cf 3 BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 94, § 2.04 [141, at 2-44 to 2-45.
514. See, e.g., Defendants' Memorandum in Parkersburg at 9-11, (No 94-1079); Defendants'
Memorandum in Vision at 3, 26, 1994 WL 326868 (No. 94-0615).
515. Securities Act of 1933 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1994) ("Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of
this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void."). A similar pro-
vision prevents waiver of the Exchange Act. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1994).
516. 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-4.
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not considered securities." 7 Since LLCs and general partnerships share many
of the same features, a reasonable investor would not assume the securities
laws apply to LLCs. For these reasons, LLC promoters may argue an LLC in-
terest may not be an interest "commonly known as a 'security."'
b. Family Resemblance Test
The Reves Court adopted the family resemblance test to determine when
an instrument denominated a "note" is a security." 8 The Court developed the
test to expand the enumerated categories of instruments that are not securi-
ties." 9 There is no indication that the Court was attempting to develop a
broader test or develop a test to determine whether an interest is one "com-
monly known as a 'security.' 5 20 Additionally, each term in the definition of
"security" is susceptible to a separate analysis, based on separate analytical
concepts. 2 ' Therefore, an argument can be made that the family resemblance
test only applies to notes.
As commentators have noted, the Reves test has created as much, if not
more, confusion than it has eliminated . 2 The four-factor family resemblance
test has been criticized by commentators as ambiguous enough to lead to a
variety of interpretations.525 In part, this is because the expectations of the
investing public are not easily discernible.5 2' Also, it is not clear what is
meant by the term the "investing public." '525 Does it mean an average reason-
able investor, a particular segment of the investing public, or those individuals
who were offered the investment opportunity?5 26 The Reves opinion provides
little guidance.527 In addition, the motivations of the buyer and seller are not
easily discernible, and any interpretation of motivations tends to be highly sub-
jective.5 2' There is no indication in the Reves opinion how a court is to de-
termine such motivations.529 It is not clear whether a court should use a sub-
jective or an objective test.530 As a result, courts are left to consider self-
serving testimony and are allowed to find the factors mean whatever the court
decides they mean.53
517. See supra note 454.
518. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 65-70 (1990).
519. Id. at 65-67.
520. See id.
521. See supra note 440 and accompanying text; cf. supra note 441 and accompanying text.
522. Gordon, supra note 487, at 402-04; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1124 & n.6,
1133-57, 1162; Steinberg, supra note 487, at 678-85.
523. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 487; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153;
Schneider, supra note 134, at 129-36; Steinberg, supra note 487.
524. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 560.
525. Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1156.
526. Id.
527. Id.; see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66 (1990).
528. Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60.
529. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66-67; Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153.
530. See Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1153.
531. Id.; Schneider, supra note 134, at 135-36.
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An analysis of court decisions applying the Reves test notes inconsisten-
cies and ambiguities abound." 2 There is no agreement as to the meaning of
each factor, or the ranking or relative weight of each factor.533 The test cre-
ates a situation where courts may determine for other reasons what the out-
come should be and then use the various factors of the family resemblance test
to justify the result reached.534
Commentators have also criticized the family resemblance test on philo-
sophical grounds.53 To what extent should the application of the securities
laws depend upon private impressions and personal motivations of those in-
volved in a transaction?536 The Reves test has been criticized for affording
too much weight to private impressions and personal motivations, rather than
emphasizing the public policy goals of the securities laws to protect the invest-
ing public and prevent fraud.537
3. Conclusions
The phrase "commonly known as a 'security"' appears applicable to inter-
ests more widely-used than LLCs.535 Given the relatively recent origin of the
LLC form,539 the variety of organizational structures available,5" and the
fact it shares many of the same features as a general partnership, 4' it is
doubtful that the LLC has reached the status of an interest "commonly known
as a 'security."'
The public's expectations are only one of many factors a court should
consider in determining whether an interest is one that is "commonly known
as a 'security."' 542 Because the public's expectations are not easily discern-
ible and such a highly subjective and speculative test would lead to inconsis-
tent and unpredictable results, a determination should not rest on that factor
alone.543 Rather, the public's expectations should be considered as one of
many relevant factors, as the Court has done to date.5"
532. Kerr & Eisenhauser, supra note 487, at 1133-57, 1162.
533. Id. at 1153; Schneider, supra note 134, at 132-36.
534. Schneider, supra note 134, at 136.
535. See Lowenfels & Bromberg, supra note 463, at 559-60 (taking issue with whether the
public's expectations and the motivations of the buyer and seller should be determinative on
whether the federal securities laws apply).
536. Id. at 560.
537. Id. Professor Goforth argues that even if courts analyze LLC interests under the family
resemblance test, LLC issuers can argue the interests are not securities under the test on the
grounds that: (i) LLC interests are not expected to be traded for speculation or investment, since
LLC interests typically have limited transferability; (ii) given that LLCs have been viewed princi-
pally as a replacement for general partnerships and general partnership interests are not securities,
investors might not expect the securities laws to apply to LLCs; and (iii) there are at least two
possible alternative regulatory schemes that reduce the risk of the investment, including various
LLC statutes that offer investor protection and the Internal Revenue Code requirements that pro-
tect investors. Goforth, supra note 7, at 1254-70.
538. See supra note 511 and accompanying text.
539. See supra note 510 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 512-13 and accompanying text.
541. See supra notes 516-17 and accompanying text.
542. See supra notes 507-09 and accompanying text.
543. See supra notes 524-27, 531 and accompanying text.
544. See supra note 501 and accompanying text.
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Nor should the courts use the family resemblance test in Reves to deter-
mine whether an interest is one that is "commonly known as a 'security."' In
light of the practical and philosophical problems with the Reves test,545 there
is little reason to broaden its application beyond its current narrow purpose to
determine whether an instrument constitutes a "note." Given the criticism of
the Reves test and the confusion it has caused, the Reves test appears an un-
likely candidate for courts to use in determining whether an interest is one that
is "commonly known as a 'security."' For these reasons, neither the public's
expectations test nor the Reves family resemblance test provides a satisfactory
test from either a practical or philosophical standpoint for determining whether
an LLC interest is a security.
E. State Statutory Grounds for Liability
1. Arguments Asserted
State legislatures have begun to take the initiative by passing legislation
that either expressly states or implies that certain LLC interests are securities.
For example, legislatures in eight states have amended their securities laws to
expressly state certain LLC interests are securities." Seven states have
amended their securities laws to include references to LLCs.547 Such refer-
ences imply the offer and sale of LLC interests are subject to that state's
securities laws. In addition, legislatures in four states have included provisions
in their limited liability company acts that raise the securities law issue."
All of these statutes provide prosecutors and civil plaintiffs with state law
grounds for arguing that certain LLC interests are securities.
States have adopted three different types of securities law statutes to ex-
pressly address whether LLC interests are securities. The first type of statute
specifically lists LLC interests in the state securities act definition of a "securi-
ty."549 If the legislature expressly lists LLC interests in the definition of a
545. See supra notes 522-37 and accompanying text.
546. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V) (Michie Supp.
1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § I-
102(t) (Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). Table II of this article contains a listing of the state statutes that
expressly address whether LLC interests are securities under state law. Table II is organized al-
phabetically by state and provides the statutory citation, a short summary of the statutory provi-
sion, and quotes the relevant language.
547. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995) (general statement); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.207A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995) (expedited registration); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
1262(l) (Supp. 1994) (exempt transactions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp.
1995) (exempt transactions); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05 (1995) (exempt securities); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994) (registration exemption); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995) (exempt transactions).
548. GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103 (West
Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.185 (Vernon Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1303
(West Supp. 1995). Table II of this article sets forth the relevant statutory language of the Geor-
gia, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin statutes.
549. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-13B-2(V); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a(14). For example, the Ohio statute pro-
vides .'security' means any ... membership interests in limited liability companies ...." For the
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
"security," prosecutors and plaintiffs may argue that state securities laws apply
to all LLC interests offered and sold in that state. In such states, courts no
longer need to determine whether LLC interests are securities under the in-
vestment contract test or a risk capital analysis.5 ° A court's inquiry is limit-
ed to whether the interest being offered or sold is an LLC interest.55" ' Prose-
cutors and plaintiffs can assert that by explicitly enumerating LLC interests in
the list of items that are "securities," the legislature mandated all LLC inter-
ests are securities and all LLC investors are entitled to the protection of the
state's securities laws. They may assert that by including LLC interests in the
definition the legislature effectively eliminated all judicial interpretation and
discretion.
The second type of statute also lists LLC interests in the state securities
act definition of a "security," but, in addition, such statutes state that an LLC
interest is not a security under certain specified circumstances.552 For exam-
ple, some statutes state that an LLC interest is not a security when all of the
members of the LLC are actively engaged in the management of the LLC.553
Moreover, some of the exclusionary provisions shift the burden of proof.554
In states adopting this statutory structure, prosecutors and plaintiffs would also
be able to argue that LLC interests are securities without having to apply the
investment contract test or any risk capital analysis.55 Litigants will battle
instead over whether the LLC interests meet the exclusionary conditions. But
these statutory conditions are subject to judicial interpretation. Courts may
draw on the Howey and risk capital lines of cases to interpret exclusionary
conditions such as "actively engaged in the management of the LLC." '556
With the new, specific statutory language, however, the issues are more limit-
ed and courts are not bound by precedent relating to the investment contract
test or risk capital test. Prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that courts are free
relevant text of the Alaska, New Mexico, and Vermont statutes, see infra Table II.
550. In Reves, Landreth, and Gould, the United States Supreme Court held that the Howey
investment contract test and the economic reality approach do not apply in cases involving instru-
ments specifically listed in the statutory definition of a "security," other than to cases involving
the catch-all category of "investment contracts." See Reves v. Emst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64
(1990); Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 691-92 & n.5 (1985); Gould v.
Ruefenacht, 471 U.S. 701, 704 (1985). If LLC interests are expressly listed in the definition of a
"security," prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue similarly that the investment contract test, the
economic reality approach, and the risk capital analysis do not apply. For a discussion of the in-
vestment contract test and risk capital tests, see supra parts III.A and 11.B, respectively.
551. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 838-39 & n.1 10. The court need only determine whether the
firm was a properly formed LLC. Id. at n.ll0.
552. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 1-102(t). For the relevant text of these statutes, see infra Table I1.
553. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k).
554. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k) ("'Security' does not include ... an interest in
a limited liability company if the person claiming that the interest is not a security can prove that
all of the members of the limited liability company are actively engaged in the management of the
limited liability company.").
555. See supra note 550.
556. Courts may draw on the Howey "efforts of others" analysis or the risk capital test control




to adopt narrower interpretations crafted to reflect the legislature's intent to
provide greater protection for LLC investors.
The third type of statute sets forth certain presumptions in its definition of
a "security." '57 For example, such statutes may state that a "security" is pre-
sumed to include an LLC interest if the right to manage the LLC is vested in
one or more managers or if the aggregate number of members exceeds a spec-
ified number.558 Similarly, such statutes may also state a "security" is not
presumed to include an interest in an LLC if the aggregate number of mem-
bers is below a specified number.559 If the LLC interest in question meets
the statutory conditions that give rise to the presumption that the interest is a
security, prosecutors and plaintiffs can claim the legislature provided the court
with clear guidance-practically a bright-line test."6 However, if the LLC
interest in question does not meet the conditions giving rise to the presump-
tion, all is not lost. The presumptions are rebuttable, although they may shift
the burden of proof.56" ' Prosecutors and plaintiffs can probably present a
Howey-type analysis in an attempt to overcome the presumptions. 62 Litiga-
tion can also focus on interpreting the language of the statute. For example,
when is the right to manage the LLC vested in one or more managers? 63 In
an attempt to provide guidance, the legislature may have added simply another
layer of analysis and more confusion. Nevertheless, such statutes provide addi-
tional grounds to argue that an LLC interest is a security. Moreover, because
the presumption is rebuttable, the statute does not preclude arguments on other
grounds.
In addition, a number of states have amended their securities laws to
include references to LLCs5  and several states have included provisions in
their limited liability company act that raise the securities law issues. 65 Pros-
ecutors and plaintiffs may claim these provisions evidence legislative intent.
They may argue that by passing such provisions, the legislature indicated that
LLC interests are securities and that LLC investors are to be afforded the
protection of the state's securities laws. All of the statutes discussed in this
557. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of
this statute, see infra Table II.
558. Id.
559. Id.
560. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 437 (discussing the Wisconsin approach). Prosecutors
and plaintiffs may assert that the presumptions indicate legislative intent. Interests in an LLC with
less than the specified number of members are not securities, while interests in an LLC with more
than the specified number of members are securities. Id.
561. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 301. The federal rules of evidence, for example, provide that a
"presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption." Id.
562. A discussion of the Howey analysis is presented supra part III.A.
563. Is the "fight to manage" satisfied by an operating agreement that vests management of
the LLC in its members, even if some members do not actually participate in its management? Or
does the "right to manage" not only require the vesting of management fights in its members, but
also actual exercise of those rights? Louis R. Briska, When Does a Member's Interest in an LLC
Become a Security?, 67 Wis. LAW., Sept. 1994, at 18, 20.
564. See supra note 547 and accompanying text.
565. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103
(West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of these statutes, see infra Table II.
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section provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with state law grounds for arguing
certain LLC interests are securities.
2. Possible Defenses
LLC issuers can challenge state statutory provisions, that either expressly
state or imply certain LLC interests are securities, on a number of grounds.
They may argue that a statutory characterization of an LLC interest as a "se-
curity" is not necessarily conclusive, since the clause preceding many
definitional sections provides "unless the context otherwise requires," thereby
mandating a review of the surrounding factual circumstances.5" Also, several
of these statutory provisions may be vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds for discriminating between domestic and foreign LLCs.567 Moreover,
all such statutory provisions are subject to judicial interpretation."'
LLC issuers can argue that including LLC interests in the statutory laun-
dry list of interests deemed "securities" does not mean all LLC interests are
automatically "securities." 5" They can contend that such statutory character-
izations are not conclusive. Inclusion in the list merely tilts the analytical scale
by creating a kind of presumption that simply makes it more difficult to estab-
lish the interest is not a security, but not impossible.57
This argument is premised on the fact that the definitional sections of the
federal securities acts57' and most state securities acts... begin with the
qualifying language "unless the context otherwise requires." Courts have inter-
preted the context clause as authorizing judicial exclusion of certain instru-
ments on the basis of factual circumstances, even if an instrument falls within
the statutory definition of a security.5 7 For example, the United States Su-
preme Court held in Reves v. Ernst & Young574 that the phrase "any note" in
the federal securities acts should not be interpreted to mean literally "any
note," but must be interpreted in light of what Congress was attempting to
accomplish.575 The Court concluded that Congress was concerned with regu-
lating the investment markets, not with creating a general cause of action for
566. See infra notes 569-82 and accompanying text.
567. See infra notes 583-85 and accompanying text.
568. See infra notes 586-96 and accompanying text.
569. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 436 (discussing New Mexico's statutory definition of
a "security").
570. Id.
571. Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1994).
572. UNIF. SEC. AcT § 401 (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1988), 7B
U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 1995); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990 (1994); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25001
(West 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1 (West 1995); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 1-102 (Supp.
1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.02 (West Supp. 1995).
573. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (excluding certain notes); Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982) (excluding certain certificates of deposit). For an
excellent critique of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the context clause, see
Marc 1. Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of a "Security":
The "Context" Clause, "Investment Contract" Analysis, and Their Ramifications, 40 VAND. L.
REV. 489 (1987); see also 2 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 873-75.
574. 494 U.S. 56 (1990).
575. Reves, 494 U.S. at 63.
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all fraud.576 Therefore, courts must look at the surrounding factual circum-
stances, including the offering context,5" to determine if a particular note is
a "security." The Court then held that many types of notes would not be treat-
ed as securities, despite inclusion of the phrase "any note" in the statutory
definition of a "security. 578
Citing a context clause, LLC issuers can argue courts are permitted to
carve out a relatively broad category of LLC interests as not constituting secu-
rities. 7 9 They can claim the context clause is intended to provide courts
some latitude to use judicial discretion and to avoid mindless, literal interpreta-
tion. 8 They can also argue that categorically defining all LLC interests as
securities is undesirable because it is over-inclusive."' While certain interests
may be within the letter of the statute, such broad coverage is not within the
spirit or intent. For instance, there is no justification for imposing all of the
consequences of the securities laws on a closely held LLC where all the mem-
bers are actively engaged in the management of the LLC 82
Also, at least two of the statutes that include LLC interests in the defini-
tion of a "security" may be subject to attack on constitutional grounds. The
definition of a "security" in Alaska provides that a "security" means an LLC
interest as defined in title 10, chapter 50 of the Alaska Statutes.583 The defi-
nition of a "security" in Wisconsin includes presumptions about interests in
LLCs organized under chapter 183 of the Wisconsin Statutes.584 Both provi-
sions appear to apply only to domestically organized LLCs. Presumably, LLCs
organized in other jurisdictions would be subject to an investment contract or
risk capital analysis. Professor Mark Sargent charges that this differential
treatment of domestic and foreign LLCs may be vulnerable to constitutional
attack under the Commerce Clause as either being discriminatory against or
placing an undue burden on interstate commerce.585
Even if a state has adopted a statute that lists LLC interests in the defini-
tion of a "security," many of the statutes contain exclusionary conditions5 6
or the statute may merely set forth a presumption. Since the exclusionary
conditions and presumptions often turn on whether members are engaged in
the management of the LLC,88 the conditions and presumptions are subject
576. Id. at 65.
577. See id. at 62-67.
578. Id. at 64-67.
579. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 436 (discussing the New Mexico securities statute).
580. 3 BLOOMENTiAL, supra note 94, § 2.01, at 2-5.
581. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039; Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 438.
582. Sargent Blue Sky, supra note 7, at 438-39.
583. ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.990(12) (1994). Title 10, chapter 50 of the Alaska Statutes in-
cludes provisions dealing with the formation of LLCs. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.50 (Supp. 1995).
For a definition of "limited liability company" and "limited liability company interest," see ALAS-
KA STAT. § 10.50.990. Both definitions refer to LLC entities organized under Alaska law. Id.
584. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c) (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of the Wis-
consin statute see infra Table I1. Chapter 183 of the Wisconsin Statutes deals with LLCs orga-
nized in Wisconsin. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 183 (West Supp. 1995).
585. SARGENT HANDBOOK, supra note 1, § 4.03[1l][a), at 4-16 to 4-17.
586. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2- 1-1(k); PA. STAT. ANN, tit. 70,
§ 1-102(t).
587. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 551.02(13)(c).
588. See, for example, the language of the California, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin
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to interpretation. LLC issuers can argue for a broad interpretation of what
constitutes member management.589 They can continue to assert that LLCs
are closely analogous to general partnerships,"g thus courts should draw on
the Howey line of cases dealing with general partnership interests to determine
who has the right to manage the LLC or whether members are engaged in the
management of the LLC.59" ' Interpretation of these conditions and presump-
tions open the door for LLC issuers to cite case law dealing with general
partnership interests and argue for a strong presumption that LLC interests are
not securities.592
LLC issuers can also argue provisions in LLC acts that raise the securities
law issue... and the various references to LLCs in state securities law stat-
utes594 are not evidence of legislative intent to treat all LLC interests as se-
curities. Most of the provisions in the LLC acts simply raise the securities law
issue and leave it to the courts to decide whether an LLC interest is a securi-
ty.595 LLC issuers can argue that references to LLCs in state securities law
registration and exemption provisions simply indicate that the legislature rec-
ognized a court may find an LLC interest to be a security under the invest-
ment contract test or a risk capital analysis.596 By adding references to LLCs,
the legislature was merely making certain that registration and exemption pro-
visions are available for LLC offerings. If the legislature intended that all LLC
interests be treated as securities, then it would have amended the state laws to
provide so, rather than including sporadic references to LLCs. As a result,
such provisions are not dispositive of legislative intent.
Challenges to state statutory provisions on the basis of a context clause,
constitutionality, interpretation, or legislative intent may serve to undercut the
statutes set forth infra Table 11.
589. Such statutes tend to exclude LLC interests if the members are actively engaged in the
management of the LLC. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1-1(k)(iii). Therefore, a broad defini-
tion of what constitutes management would tend to exclude more LLC interests from coverage
under the securities laws.
590. See supra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
591. For a discussion of the Howey line of cases dealing with partnership interests and a dis-
cussion of the arguments LLC issuers may make, see supra part III.A.2.
592. Several courts have stated there is a strong presumption that general partnership interests
are not securities under the Howey investment contract test. See supra note 241 and accompanying
text.
593. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11- 1107(n) (1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.5103
(West Supp. 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.1303 (West Supp. 1995). For the relevant text of the
Georgia, Michigan, and Wisconsin statutes, see infra Table II.
594. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36b-1 (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 502.207A(2)(a) (West Supp. 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(l) (Supp. 1994); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:709(12) (West Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-05(4), (10), (11), (13)
(1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06(4), (6), (10), (14) (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-
07(2)(b)(3) (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:11(11) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421-B:13(l) (Supp. 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:17(ll)(k) (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-514(B)(7)(b) (Michie Supp. 1995).
595. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-1107(n) ("Nothing in this chapter shall be construed
as establishing that a limited liability company interest is not a 'security'...."); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 183.1303 ("An interest in a limited liability company may be a 'security'....").
596. For a discussion of the grounds for finding that an LLC interest is a security under the
investment contract test or risk capital analysis, see supra parts III.A and III.B.
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statutory arguments made by prosecutors and plaintiffs. If nothing else, such
challenges provide grounds for increased litigation.
3. Conclusions
Prosecutors and plaintiffs have a very strong argument that all LLC inter-
ests are securities in states that specifically list LLC interests, without any
qualifications or conditions, in the state securities law definition of a "securi-
ty."'597 Several states do not have context clauses preceding the statutory defi-
nitions."' Clearly all LLC interests are securities in such states.
Even in states where the definitional section begins with a context clause
qualification, prosecutors and plaintiffs have strong arguments that all LLC
interests in such states are securities. They may argue that the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly said that the "starting point in every case in-
volving construction of a statute is the language itself."' The context clause
usually does not modify the term "security" in particular, but generally pre-
cedes a long list of general definitions.' Early drafts of the proposed federal
securities laws show the context clause language was intended to refer to the
context in which the defined terms appeared in the statute itself."I The con-
text clause only meant that the same words may have different meanings in
different parts of the same act. Parties may argue the context clause was not
meant to refer to the context of the underlying transaction. 2 Given the leg-
islative intent, prosecutors and plaintiffs may contend that courts should not
use the context clause to justify excluding any LLC interests from the defini-
tion of a "security" on the basis of the offering context.
The Landreth3 case also provides prosecutors and plaintiffs with
grounds for arguing that the plain meaning of the statutory language should
control. In Landreth, the United States Supreme Court held that since the term
"stock" was plainly within the statutory definition of a "security," the plain
meaning of the statute mandated that the stock in question be treated as a
security.' There was no reason to examine the offering context or underly-
ing transaction."5 Similarly, prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that inclu-
sion of LLC interests in the definition of a "security" mandates that all LLC
interests must be treated as securities.
597. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01 (Baldwin Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
9, § 4202a (1993 & Supp. 1995).
598. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4202a.
599. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, I., concur-
ring); accord Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
600. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1994); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401 (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985);
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (1988), 7B U.L.A. 91 (Supp. 1995).
601. For a discussion of early drafts of the federal securities laws and the context clause lan-
guage, see Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 504-05 & n.91; see also Gary S. Rosin,
Functional Exclusions from the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 333, 363-64 (1986).
602. Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 504.
603. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985).
604. Id. at 687, 697.
605. Id. at 690.
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Even though the United States Supreme Court excluded certain notes and
certificates of deposits from the definition of a "security" based on factual
context," prosecutors and plaintiffs can argue that such cases are distin-
guishable. Changes in the usage of notes and certificates of deposits by the
financial community over time and significant variations in the character of
these instruments resulted in changes in their meanings. 7 Although both
terms are listed in the definition of a "security," ' 8 the terms no longer have
well-settled meanings.' The Court therefore looked behind the labels to the
offering context to determine if instruments labeled notes and certificates of
deposits should be treated as securities.60 Prosecutors and plaintiffs, howev-
er, may argue LLC interests are different. LLC interests are not some unusual
type of financial instrument.6 ' Neither the meaning of the term nor the
character of LLC interests have changed. There is no need to look beyond the
characteristics of the instrument. The legislature meant what it said: LLC
interests are securities. The plain meaning of the statute should control. No
justification exists for judicial modification of the statutory terms based on the
factual situation because legislative intent is clear.
By including LLC interests in the statutory definition of a "security," the
legislature presumably intended to provide some certainty and
predictability.6 2 The legislature wished to make clear that certain LLC inter-
ests are securities. If courts begin to use the context clause to exclude interests
that clearly fit within the statutory definition, courts will undermine the legis-
lative purpose. Such exclusions create uncertainty." 3 When courts do not ap-
ply the law according to its express terms, they reduce the public's ability to
understand what the law requires of them. Without lawyers, discovery, and
litigation, neither LLC issuers nor investors will know whether their transac-
tion is covered by the securities laws. In the interest of predictability and
clarity, courts should resist judicially excluding interests expressly listed in the
definition. Moreover, the statutes neither define nor even suggest the scope of
the context clause.6 4 Nor have courts ever really elaborated on the precise
606. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) (stating that a note may or may not be
a security); Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) (holding that a certificate of deposit
purchased from a federally regulated bank is not a security).
607. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 62-63 (discussing notes); Landreth, 471 U.S. at 694 (discussing
notes); Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-58 & n.5 (discussing certificates of deposit); see also 2
Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 99, at 875 n.18 (tracing changes in the meaning of the term note).
608. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(!); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); UNIF. SEC. ACT § 401(l) (1958), 7B U.L.A. 578 (1985).
609. See supra note 607 and accompanying text.
610. See Reves, 494 U.S. at 64-70 (addressing notes); Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 555-59
(discussing certificates of deposit).
611. Cf. Landreth, 471 U.S. at 689-90 n.4 (noting that cases where the Court looked at the
economic reality of the transaction usually "involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the definition").
612. If a securities act does not list LLC interests in its definition of a security, courts gener-
ally must conduct a case-by-case investment contract or risk capital analysis to determine if the
interest is a security. See discussion supra parts III.A and III.B.
613. See Gary S. Rosin, Historical Perspectives on the Definition of a Security, 28 S. TEX. L.
REV. 575, 618 (1987); Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 490.
614. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039.
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role of the context clause.6 5 Courts should not expand the use of this vague
concept which creates uncertainty and allows for unbounded judicial discre-
tion.6"6 Courts should apply the statute according to its express terms, rather
than using the context clause to embark down the road of judicial activism.
Courts should also resist LLC issuer efforts to draw on the Howey line of
cases dealing with general partnership interests in interpreting statutory phrases
dealing with LLC interests. If the legislature intended courts simply to apply
the Howey investment contract test, any references to LLCs in the definition
would be superfluous. It may be argued that by including a reference to LLCs
in the definition of a "security," the legislature intended to provide greater
guidance to the courts than the Howey test provides, and possibly more cer-
tainty and increased investor protection. Following a Howey line of cases
would undermine the legislature's intent. The new statutory language frees the
courts to adopt judicial interpretations that provide greater investor protection
and more certainty. As a result, state statutes that address the issue of whether
LLC interests are securities may provide prosecutors and plaintiffs with some
very powerful weapons in arguing that LLC interests are securities.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
While commentators are divided on the issue of whether LLC interests
should be treated as securities,6"7 the SEC and at least thirty-five state securi-
ties commissions have taken the position that certain LLC interests may be
securities.6 Commentators, the SEC, and state securities agencies have ad-
vanced five different legal theories in their attempts to bring LLC offerings
within the ambit of the securities laws. These theories include the investment
contract test, the risk capital test, the characteristics of stock test, the common-
ly known as a security test, and state statutory grounds. Clearly certain LLC
interests can be securities under the Howey investment contract test and a risk
capital analysis.6"9 While prosecutors and plaintiffs may make colorable ar-
guments that LLC interests are securities under the characteristics of stock test
or the commonly known as a security test,62° such arguments probably will
not prevail. In light of both practical and philosophical problems, there is little
reason to broaden the application of the characteristics of stock test or the
commonly known as a security test to cover LLC interests.62" ' The recent
passage of state statutes defining certain LLC interests as securities provides
prosecutors and plaintiffs with additional state law grounds for arguing LLC
interests are securities.622 While such statutes are subject to judicial interpre-
615. See Steinberg & Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 490-91.
616. McGinty, supra note 270, at 1039; Rosin, supra note 601, at 361-64; Steinberg &
Kaulbach, supra note 573, at 511-12.
617. See supra note 7.
618. See supra notes 8-19 and accompanying text.
619. See supra parts III.A.I, III.A.3, III.B.1, and III.B.3.
620. See supra parts III.C.I and III.D.1.
621. See supra parts II1.C.2, 1II.C.3, IlI.D.2, and III.D.3.
622. See supra parts III.E.1 and III.E.3.
19961
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tation, these statutes may prove to be a powerful weapon for prosecutors and
plaintiffs attempting to apply the securities laws to LLC offerings.
As courts grapple with these various legal theories to determine whether
LLC interests are securities, they will have the opportunity to refine and devel-
op the definition of a security. How the courts apply the securities laws to the
offer and sale of LLC interests will determine the degree of protection afford-
ed investors. Absent legislative action, courts will use the Howey investment
contract test and the risk capital tests to determine whether an LLC interest is
a security." 3 The formulation of the Howey test and the risk capital tests, the
remedial purpose of the securities laws,624 the hybrid nature of the LLC enti-
ty, and the recent proliferation of fraudulent LLC schemes,625 all compel the
conclusion that each LLC offering must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
Courts must focus on the substance, not the form, of each transaction and
examine the economic realities of the transaction, not just the operating docu-
ments.626 Applying general partnership case law and its related presumptions
to LLC offerings is inappropriate and will lead to undesirable results.6" If
the courts determine there is a need for presumptions to provide clear, predict-
able rules, they should presume that LLC interests are securities.62 The costs
associated with such a presumption would be minimal in most situations, but
the protection provided investors would be great. However, if the goal is truly
clarity, predictability, and maximizing investor protection, the best approach
would be for legislatures to enact legislation expressly stating that all LLC
interests are securities. 629
623. See supra parts III.A.3 and III.B.3.
624. See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1974); Fortier v. Ramsey, 220 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Ga. Ct. App.
1975).
625. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text; see also Division of Enforcement Warns
of Fraud in the Sale of Unregistered Securities of Telecommunications Technology Ventures,
News Release, SEC 94-105, 1994 WL 507361 (SEC) (Sept. 16, 1994) (explaining that fraudulent
telecommunications technology ventures frequently take the form of LLCs); Jim McTague, Regu-
lators Say Cable-TV Investment Scams Are Rampant, BARRON'S, Sept. 5, 1994, at 15 (explaining
that "scamsters" try to steer clear of securities regulators by using LLCs); Ellen E. Schultz, IRA
Money May Attract Shady Deals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 1994, at Cl (reporting that many of the
deals are packaged as LLCs).
626. See supra parts IIl.A.3 and III.B.3.
627. See supra part III.A.3.
628. See supra notes 324-29 and accompanying text.
629. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4202a(14) (Supp. 1995).
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